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ENGAGING THE SPECTRUM: CIVIC
VIRTUE AND THE PROTECTION OF
STUDENT VOICE IN SCHOOLSPONSORED FORUMS
ROBERT

R. VERCHICK*

Listen:
-

Slaughterhouse-Five'

East Hazelwood High's school newspaper is not what it used to
be. In 1988, the Supreme Court held that East Hazelwood's principal could excise two pages from Spectrum, the school newspaper,
without violating the student reporters' rights of free speech. 2 The
censored pages included an article describing students' experiences
with pregnancy and another article discussing the impact of divorce
on East Hazelwood students. Although Spectrum's faculty adviser
approved the stories, the principal feared they might invade the privacy of students and parents.3 He also believed the stories were "inappropriate" for student readers in their early teens.4 In a
surprisingly broad holding, the Court announced that school authorities could exercise editorial control over the style and content
of school-sponsored expressive activities as long as their actions
'5
were "reasonably related to pedagogical concerns."
The Hazelwood decision sent a disturbing message to high
school students. By explicitly granting less constitutional protection in forums where students are most likely to have the attention
of administrators, teachers and other students, the Court discouraged them from joining with one another to explore relevant social
issues. Because classroom curricula are also "school-sponsored,"
the decision appeared to condone the existing trend of diminishing
* Associate Attorney, Riddell, Williams, Bullitt & Walkinshaw in Seattle,
Washington; J.D. 1989, Harvard Law School; A.B. 1986, Stanford University.
Many thanks to Martha Minow for her advice and encouragement on this
article.
1. K. VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE, OR THE CHILDREN'S CRUSADES,
A DUTY-DANCE WITH DEATH 20 (1969).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988).
Id. at 263-64.
Id.
Id. at 273.
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6
the range of ideas in student coursework through book censorship.
The broad mandate of Hazelwood has already sent a ripple
effect through the public school systems. According to People of the
American Way, a citizens' group committed to free speech, school
censorship is on the rise. In 1989, the group reported 172 incidents
of school censorship in 42 states. 7 Federal courts have been asked
to apply Hazelwood to resolve controversies involving textbook
bans,8 underground newspapers, 9 and even the choice of recruiters
at a school's "Career Day."10

In January, the war in the Persian Gulf sparked several new
conflicts between student activities and school officials at home. At
one high school outside of Pittsburgh, 150 students were suspended
after walking out of classes to protest what they saw as their
school's lack of attention to the war." I
One way to see Hazelwood is as a shift in political tides. The
Court's decision rose on a wave Of popular support for a return to
discipline, respect, and singular values in the classroom. 12 But seen
another way, the Hazelwood standard flows from a legal debate illsuited for the protection of student speech or inquiry that occurs in
group forums. While defenders of the school administration are
willing to trade free inquiry and group discussion for symbols of
order and tradition,, proponents of student speech too often focus
only on the right of an individual to flourish through self-examination and self-expression. Those who argue that encouraging individual free speech and inquiry prepares students for group
democracy, 13 appear more interested in developing tools for per6. See School Book CensorshipEfforts Haven't Died Down, Groups Claim,
Education Daily, Sept. 1, 1988, at 3. See generally S. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING (1983).

7. Mydans, In a Small Town, a Battle Over a Book, New York Times, Sept.
3, 1989, at 22, col. 1.
8. Virgil v. School Bd. of Columbia County, Florida, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th
Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Virgil II], aff'g 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
9. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988).
10. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).

11. Celis, What Should Be Taught About War In The Gu/l., The New York
Times, January 23, 1991, at B9, col. 1.
12. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A NA-

TION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) [hereinafter
A NATION AT RISK]; Bennet, Critical Issues in Education Reform, 1 NOTRE
DAME J. OF LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 425 (1985); Hafen, Developing Student
Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as Mediating
Structures,48 OHIO ST. L.J. (1987).
13. See, e.g., Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: the Conflict Between
Authority and IndividualRights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986);
Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the
Schools: "Justifyinga Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 497 (1983); see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 277
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sonal deduction than on creating moments of group deliberation.
Such justifications of student speech are bound in current conceptions of pluralist democracy.
This essay suggests a new justification for protecting student
speech that specifically addresses the need for free expression and
inquiry in school-sponsored forums. Starting with the proposition
that student speech prepares one for self-government, I suggest we
re-define the kind of self-government to which we ask students to
aspire. By recasting our conception of democracy in a way that
highlights universal participation and group transformation, we
will find a theory of government much closer to the values of group
discovery and social reform.
In order to teach students to grow as more civic-minded individuals - that is to say, people more devoted to improving society
for all members - schools must treat speech differently. They
must provide opportunities for students to examine issues together,
to engage the spectrum of voices in their community, and to transcend individual understandings of any one issue. While encouraging students to exercise their voice, school officials must also learn
to listen to the contributions they are encouraging their students to
make. Schools, I suggest, can only promote civic virtue if they protect student communication within school-sponsored forums.
In Part I of this essay, I argue that the Supreme Court has traditionally viewed student speech cases as conflicts between the autonomy of an individual student and the authority of a communitybased school. Tracing the evolution of the Court's student speech
doctrine, I suggest that the majority and dissenting opinions in
these cases fall into one of two educational paradigms - what I call
the Autonomy and Authority models. As a means of protecting student interests in communication and of promoting democratic education, neither model proves sufficient. Supporters of the
Autonomy view concentrate too much on speech as a means to individual self-inquiry. They underemphasize the communal side of student development. Supporters of Authority do not give students
enough room to explore the bounds of freedom and responsibility
necessary in democratic society.
Part II offers an alternate way of interpreting student speech,
which I call the Engagement model. This new perspective draws
from the educational work of John Dewey, the more radical approaches of Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, and from the newly
revived political theories of civic republicanism. According to the
Engagement view, student speech is the mechanism for group discovery and social transformation. As a means to these ends, student
speech must include deliberative dialogue among students, teachers, and administrators.
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In Part III, I examine the Supreme Court's most recent student
speech case, Hazelwood, in view of the previous discussion. I suggest that Hazelwood's sweeping treatment of school-sponsored
speech indirectly results from the Court's method .of balancing individual autonomy against community authority. I point out that,
from the perspective of the Engagement model, the Hazelwood
opinion threatens to undercut the kinds of student dialogue most
important to democratic education. In the last section of Part III, I
discuss what kinds of school restrictions on speech the Engagement
model might permit, and suggest a more constructive way of resolving future disputes between schools and students.
I.

AUTONOMY V. AUTHORITY

The widow Douglas, she took me for her son and allowed that she
would sivilize me; but it was rough living in the house all the time...
and so when I could't stand it no longer, I lit out.
14
- The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn
It is, perhaps, very American to view disagreement with the
social order as a conflict between individual autonomy and civilized
authority. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,15
Justice Jackson etched this dichotomy between autonomy and authority into the foundation stone of all future speech cases. Deciding whether the West Virginia State Board of Education could
require a student to salute the flag against his religious beliefs,
Jackson wrote, "[t]he sole conflict [in this case] is between the authority [of the state] and rights of the individual."'1 6 On one hand,
he weighed the interests of a school system endowed with the "important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions" of teaching
young people. 17 On the other hand, he recognized an individual student's right to be free from official prescriptions of political or religious orthodoxy.' 8 Holding the actions of the state board of
education to a heightened standard of scrutiny, Justice Jackson,
with the majority, sided with the student.1 9
In the forty-seven years since Barnette, students and their parents have challenged a number of school policies that affect student
speech, including a ban of student political protest, 20 the removal of
14. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 1 (W.

Fischer eds. 1985) (1st ed., London, 1884).
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
16. Id. at 630.
17. Id. at 637.
18. Id. at 642.
19. Id.

Blair & V.

20. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (school may not forbid students from wearing armbands in protest to
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books from a school library, 21 the-punishment of student speech at
a school assembly, 22 and the censorship of a student-run school
newspaper. 23 In all of these controversies, the Court justified its
results by appealing either to the interests of the individual or of
the community. These appeals fall into two fairly well-defined categories, which I refer to as the Autonomy and Authority models.
An examination of each reveals the shortcomings of the Court's
current dialectic approach and suggests an alternate way of viewing
free-speech disputes in the public schools.
A. Autonomy
At the heart of the Supreme Court's doctrine against school orthodoxy rests a strong presumption for individual autonomy. Often
drawing from theories first developed in "adult" constitutional law,
protectors of student rights in the orthodoxy cases gradually defined a student's interest in personal expression as an individual
and fundamental right that is essential to democratic self-rule.
This conception of student autonomy developed in stages. The
Supreme Court first protected students from orthodoxy in the early
1920s, just as the Court was beginning to recognize a relationship
between individual autonomy and the ability to express ideas. 24 In
Meyer v. Nebraska 25 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,26 the Court
struck down school policies that threatened to instill a system of
common belief among students. The majority in Meyer warned
against unconstitutional attempts to "foster a homogeneous people."' 27 The Court in Pierceemphasized the parents' interest in raising their young and warned that a child is not a "creature of the
State. ' 28 Both opinions relied exclusively on the "liberties" clause
of the fourteenth amendment; yet the specific "liberty" protected
Vietman War where conduct does not threaten material disruption of the educational mission).
21. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982) [hereinafter Pico] (school may not remove books from school
library simply because it dislikes the ideas such books contain).
22. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672 (1986) (upholding
suspension of student for delivering a "loud and vulgar" speech at a school
assembly).
23. See generally Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274
(1988).
24. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Note, The Promise of Pico: A New Definition of
Orthodoxy, 97 YALE L.J. 1805 (1987).
25. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state laws that forbid the teaching of
German to students).
26. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating state laws that require all students to
attend only public schools).
27. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
28. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
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by these cases remained vague. 29
Barnette and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commmunity
School District,30 mark the second stage of the Court's development

of student autonomy. The Barnette decision gave needed substance
and form to student autonomy. Recalling the holdings of Meyer
and Pierce, Justice Jackson, for the majority, wrote that the Constitution forbids the "compulsory unification of opinion. '31 Yet, unlike either of these earlier opinions, Justice Jackson grounded this
conclusion in the free speech and free exercise provisions of the
32
first amendment.
Twenty-six years later, the Court in Tinker, invoked Barnette
to invalidate the suspension of three students who had protested
the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to class. 33 For the
Tinker majority, the school's punishment of such political dissent
was yet another attempt to transform students into "closed circuit
recipients" of state-approved ideas. 34 Yet, as some commentators
have pointed out, Tinker is more than a rote application of Barnette.35 The Barnette decision protected students from being required to affirm state-approved ideas with which they disagreed.
Tinker guaranteed students an opportunity to actively dissent from
those ideas. Perhaps even more striking, Tinker assured students
the right to select their own medium of non-disruptive dissent. After all, the school's narrow prohibition of armbands that was struck
down by the Court, had actually allowed other forms of expressing
36
dissent.
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District
No. 26 v. Pico,37 is the last case in which a majority of the Supreme
Court sought to expand the free speech rights of students. In an
unusually splintered opinion, the Court in Pico held that local
school boards may not remove books from the school library simply
because they dislike the ideas those books contain. 38 Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, based the holding on the proscription
29. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. The Court relied on
the fourteenth, rather than the first amendment, because the first amendment
had not yet been applied to the states; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (Court stated that freedom of speech and of the press as secured by the
Constitution is not an absolute right to speak without responsibility).
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
32. Id. at 641; see Note, supra note 13, at 497.
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507,
514 (1969).
34. Id. at 511.
35. Note, supra note 24, at 1810.
36. Id.
37. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
38. Id. at 870-71.
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against orthodoxy in school and on a student's first amendment
right to receive ideas in the school library.3 9 Although many commentators have criticized Justice Brennan's discussion of a "right to
ideas" as unnecessary and misguided, 40 this rationale can be viewed
as but another logical extension of the orthodoxy doctrine. 41 In
guaranteeing one's opportunity to actively dissent from school
messages, the protection against orthodoxy must also provide access
42
to dissenting ideas and an opportunity to evaluate them freely.

Together, the cases discussed above constitute a paradigm of
student-speech theory devoted to the twin objectives of autonomy
and citizenship. Justice Forta's declaration that students do not
"shed their rights at the schoolhouse gate" 43 resonates as a powerful anthem for the central human interests shared by both adults
and children. Adherents to the Autonomy model implicitly recognize that although students' identities and values may not be fully
formed, students are capable of the same kind of clear thinking and
self-inquiry that justifies governmental respect for adult autonomy.
The Court first recognized student autonomy in Barnette when
it characterized the interest against orthodoxy as freedom of individual thought rather than as a protection of the Barnette family's
religious beliefs.44 In Tinker, Justice Fortas justified free studentspeech on the theory that truth arises from the free competition of
ideas, even though past proponents of this theory had never envisioned the activities of children. 4 The Court calls the American
high school a "marketplace of ideas" where students discover
"truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,' [rather] than through any
'46
kind of authoritative selections.
When Justice Brennan formulated a positive right to receive
ideas in Pico, he similarly revealed confidence in students' abilities
to examine information and reach personal and responsible conclusions. Justice Brennan first cites FirstNational Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,4 7 a case acknowledging the rights of adult voters to public
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
(1969).
44.
45.

Id. at 866-68, 70.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 508-09; Note, supra note 24, at 1805.
Note, supra note 24, at 1813.
See id.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (C. Shields ed. 1956) (1st ed. London 1859); J.
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA - A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENS'D PRINTING
(London 1644); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market).
46. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)).
47. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (cited in Pico, 457 U.S. at 866).
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access of political ideas, in establishing the right to receive ideas in a
49
school library. 48 He next draws from Griswold v. Connecticut
and Stanley v. Georgia5 0 _ two cases that emphasize individuality
and maturity in supporting the right to receive and evaluate
information.
Woven into the notion of student speech as an inherent liberty,
is also the idea that tolerance of student speech fulfills the school's
primary function of training youth for citizenship. In Barnette, Justice Jackson wrote: "[t]hat [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes."'1 Justice Jackson's observation
that we cannot teach what we do not practice has been confirmed
52
by educational research.
Of course, not all educationally sound theories demand Constitutional protections. But Justice Jackson and future adherents of
the Autonomy model believed that sound civic education was a precondition to any meaningful exercise of civil liberties in the future.
Therefore, at least some minimum standards of school conduct was
constitutionally compelled. 53 The notion that a free citizenry presupposes civic education remains a cornerstone of the Autonomy
model.
An extension of this idea, implied in both Tinker and Pico, was
that as the conceptions and preconditions of democratic participation evolve, so would the Court's notion of civic education. Thus, as
social protests and other methods of mass petition gained greater
legitimacy in the 1960s, the Tinker Court expanded the meaning of
Barnette to guarantee non-disruptive, symbolic dissent. As doctrines emphasizing individual inquiry and personal decisionmaking
48. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting right of married couple to obtain and use
contraceptives) (cited in Pico, 457 U.S. at 866); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976) (protecting right of minor to choose abortion without the consent of
her parents).
50. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment prohibits states from outlawing
the private possession of obscene material) (cited in Pico, 457 U.S. at 866).
51. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
52. See infra note 92 for a discussion on educational research which favors
participatory decision-making exercises over authoritarian approaches.
53. The theory that the structure of democratic government leads to certain
constitutionally guaranteed preconditions was fully developed by Alexander
Meiklejohn in the same decade as Barnette. Meiklejohn believed that true selfdetermination in democratic society presupposed a guarantee of free speech.
He argued that courts should evaluate governmental conduct on the basis of
whether such conduct helps or hinders speech in this capacity. See generally A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT

Note, supra note 13.

(1948);
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took root in the late 1960s and 70s, Justice Brennan's doctrine of
free inquiry followed students into the school library. As he explains in Pico: "[A]ccess [of ideas] prepares students for active participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they
4
will soon be members."5
In the name of both individual rights and preparation for citizenship, supporters of the Autonomy model see schools as learning
centers that should (at least in part) encourage a loosely guided rehearsal of competing student voices. Schools provide students with
a fair opportunity to discover and accept values and to practice promoting those values in the political marketplace of ideas. Aware of
the dangers of creating a "homogeneous people," proponents of Autonomy do not expect students to arrive necessarily at the same
note. Theirs is a school of "duelling banjos."
Justices supporting the Autonomy model would be the first to
admit that there are limits. No court has yet suggested that the
first amendment protects students who materially disrupt the functions of the school. Even for ardent supporters of student liberties,
the threshold of disruption may be small.55 Supporters of the Autonomy model also concede the need for inculcating at least some
values. Although they have stressed the importance of values necessary to democracy, 56 they have also endorsed the teaching of
57
traditional "social, moral, and political" values of the community.
They would, however, limit this conveyance of community values to
a point before it becomes politically biased 58 or threatens to pre59
scribe orthodoxy in politics, nationalism, or religion.
Overall, proponents of the Autonomy model show little confidence in inculcative policies, even if developed by democratic, wellmeaning school districts. 6° For them, small local authorities prove
even less vigilant in protecting against prescriptions of orthodoxy.
Such local groups often have little incentive to protect views of the
minority and may be isolated from the public media which would
61
otherwise challenge their actions.
54. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
55. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672, 687 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (allowing that a speech containing sexual innuendo constitutes disruption of an educational activity).
56. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 864.
57. See id.
58. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943); Pico, 457 U.S. at 871.
59. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
60. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637-38.
61. Id.
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The notion that courts should protect student speech as an end
in itself correctly identifies students as contributing members of
their society. The corresponding view that protection of speech further develops one's ability to participate in politics imports a degree
of pragmatism to first amendment theory, while correctly identifying student speech as both a current and future right. Perhaps most
helpful, the Autonomy perspective suggests an evolving standard of
impermissible orthodoxy designed to keep pace with changing notions of democracy and governmental participation. Yet, as it is currently defined, the Autonomy model contains three major
weaknesses. These weaknesses stem from a current conception
that over-emphasizes individual liberties and private preferences.
The first objection to the Autonomy model centers on its reason for acknowledging student liberty. As we have seen, members
of the Autonomy camp justify protections of student speech, in part,
on the basis that students are capable of the same kind of rational
decisionmaking that we attribute to adults. Yet to supporters of
Autonomy, most students are clearly not adults.62 If adherents to
this view saw students as truly autonomous people, they could not
justify a school's mild inculcation of community values. They could
not even justify compulsory education itself. Constitutional guarantees based on autonomy seem automatically fixed to a sliding
scale of a student's perceived maturity level. This notion does not
provide students with a very strong or predictable claim for first
amendment protection.
Second, by concentrating on individual interests, the Autonomy perspective does not sufficiently stress the importance of group
participation in the development of political preferences. The constitutional guarantees of Barnette, Tinker, and Pico rely more heavily on individual liberties and private preferences than on group
development. The Barnette decision essentially protects one's conscious. Tinker protects students' rights to silently convey political
messages to passive viewers. Although the Court in Tinker does
speak of encouraging the robust exchange of ideas in school, it does
not deeply consider how or why students' preferences should be
formed as a result. 63 Significantly, it seems likely that at least some
of the Tinker children had borrowed their parents' political opin64
ions without critically evaluating them.
62. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("a child.., is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition
of First Amendment guarantees.") (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
649-50 (1968)).
63. See Note, supra note 24, at 1811.
64. The Tinker children had been encouraged by their parents to wear
black armbands to school. Their ages ranged from 8 to 15 years old. See Tinker,
393 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Pico provides the most explicit treatment of the rights of a student body to receive and develop points of view. But the plurality's
opinion ultimately proves unsatisfactory since it confines the right
65
to evaluate ideas to individual inquiry within a library setting.
As we have already seen, Justice Brennan grounded the Court's
protection of free inquiry on precedent primarily concerned with
private choice. The non-interactive nature of this inquiry is highlighted by Justice Brennan's description of a library as "a place
dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty." 66
None of the cases from Meyer to Pico substantively addresses
students' interests in maintaining dialogue with teachers, administrators, or other members of the school community. In the words of
one district court, "First Amendment freedoms retained at the
schoolhouse gate may be shed at the classroom door."'6 7 By seeing
student preferences as individual, pre-packaged interests, rather
than as products of communal and group interaction, the Court creates a doctrine for student rights which is at odds with the group
nature of learning.
Finally, in their enthusiasm to protect students from constitutional infringements within the school, supporters of the Autonomy
model underemphasize the role students will play in their outside
community before and after they graduate. The brand of civic education protected by Justices Jackson and Fortas may have advantages in state or federal politics. But the Court should find a way to
translate its first amendment protections in ways that will enable
students to involve themselves productively in community affairs as
well. This concern with students as members of the local community plays a more prominent role in the Authority perspective.
B. Authority
If the Autonomy model takes its shape through the Court's
progress toward the protection of student speech, the Authority
model exists as a force of resistance to that change. Barnette,
Tinker, and Pico, all produced dissenting opinions.68 The objections
of those in the Authority camp resound with a sincere and unified
concern for order in the class, the inculcation of values, and a com65. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
66. Id. (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (emphasis

added).
67. Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 690 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) (referring
to Pico in the context of the Hazelwood standard).
68. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 884-85, 893 (Burger, J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J.,
and O'Connor, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515, 526 (1969) (Black, J., and Harlan, J., dissenting); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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munity's freedom to control its youth. Apparently, these objections
have been heard. The Court's most recent student-speech cases,
Fraserand Hazelwood, each signify a move toward the Authority
camp.
Supporters of the Authority model see public education as a
means of teaching students to respect the authority of a democratic
government and to understand the freedoms and responsibilities of
ordered liberty. They acknowledge the importance of preparing individuals to participate in their government. 69 Yet this is achieved
by "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system. '70 For some, this means occasional
disciplining of students when they act inconsistently with those values. 71 As Justice O'Connor notes in her dissenting opinion in Pico,
public schools are also charged with the vital role of teaching stu72
dents the basic skills they will need to function in society.
Effective transmission of these lessons requires an "orderly exposure" to selected information; 73 this presupposes a conducive
learning environment where students respect their teachers and
each other.74 Not surprising, duelling banjos are discouraged. In
the Authority model, education works best when teachers envelope
their students in smooth and precise orchestrations, where students
play muted or complementary parts. Thus, a school has an interest
in selecting faculty voices most likely to harmonize with its
message. 75 Students who distract the school's audience with
messages substantially out of sync with the school's may be silenced.76 As Justice Black put it, "[O]ne may, I hope, be permitted
to harbor the thought that taxpayers send [their] children to school
' 77
on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not teach.
69. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672, 681 (1986).
70. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
71. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 686; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting)
("School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of
training our children to be good citizens...").
72. Pico, 457 U.S. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 914; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order,

teachers cannot begin to educate their students"); Hafen, supra note 12, at 686-

87 (citing studies which indicate that educational approaches emphasizing order
and discipline succeed more often than those that do not).
74. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672, 681 (1986) (public
education must inculcate the "habits and manners of civility" as "indispensable
to the practice of self government").
75. See Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state statute that

forbids teacher certification to persons who are not citizens of the United
States).
76. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 685; Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
77. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Adherents of the Authority model place great emphasis on the
purity of the school's message because, for them, this message
comes from the local community itself. Close ties between the community and the school help fulfill the strong interests parents have
in instilling values in their young. Such a bond also promises to
promote cohesive local communities that are based on shared principles and interests. 78 A school that accurately reflects the principles valued by community members must rely on efficient and
accessible democratic processes, such as P.T.A. meetings and school
board hearings. For Chief Justice Burger, the degree of parental
involvement in shaping the message of the public schools is
inspiring:
In most public schools in the United States the parents have a large
voice in running the school. Through participation in the election of
school board members, the parents influence, if not control, the direction of their children's education.
A school board ...is truly 'of the
79
people and by the people.'
Justice Powell has echoed this sentiment, declaring that "no single
agency of government at any level is closer to the people whom it
serves than the typical school board."8 0
As both barometers and shapers of community values, public
schools play a uniquely symbiotic role with the society around
them. The school's role of educating and providing role models permeates inside and outside the boundaries of a school's campus. A
school's reputation and the ideas it becomes associated with, according to this view, affect not only the lessons learned in school, but
the confidence the community will maintain in the educational
structure. This explains why the Court in Fraser,and later in Hazelwood, placed such emphasis on a school's interest in disassociat81
ing itself from objectionable speech.
Pointing out a school's unique role as educator and communitybuilder, adherents to the Authority model do not see public schools
as state actors in the traditional constitutional sense. Rather,
schools are more like parental substitutes, or what Professor Hafen
82
has called "mediating structures" between families and the state.
In reviewing the issue of student protections against search and
seizures, for instance, Justice Powell stressed the "special" and non78. Pico, 457 U.S. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1986);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988). In Hazelwood, concern for the school's outward image as role model also helps explain
the majority's (otherwise irrelevant) fear that the newspaper's articles on pregnancy might fall into the hands of the students' younger brothers or sisters. See
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274-75.
82. See Hafen, supra note 12, at 696.
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adversarial relationship a student has with a teacher.8 3 He called
attention to the "personal responsibility" teachers often feel for the
welfare of their students.8 4 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Pico,
similarly underscored the state's role as educator and wrote that, in
such a situation, the first amendment "may speak with a different
85
voice."
Because adherents of the Authority model believe the school
uniquely represents community objectives - and because those
objectives often promise order and control - they are willing to
give school policies a great deal of discretion.8 6 Adherents also
worry that close judicial scrutiny of school policy will chill educational policymaking and "corrode the school board's authority and
effectiveness. 8 7 In addition, courts rarely seem competent to make
decisions regarding pedagogical approaches and, even then, are not
directly accountable to community members.
Beneath the view that would restrict student voice as a means
of creating order and perpetuating values, is a belief that a student's
interest in free expression is not the same as an adult's. When talking to young people, the first amendment does, indeed, speak in a
different voice. Part of the justification for this different treatment
'
rests on "the special characteristics of the school environment."88
For proponents of Authority, there is also a related belief that
many traditional interests underlying free speech guarantees do not
fully exist when applied to young people.
Conventional political wisdom holds that the protection of free
expression serves at least three main functions: (1) it allows citizens to realize their personal identities; (2) it allows citizens to find
truth through open debate; and (3) it allows citizens to participate
easily in the political process.8 9 These justifications stress government respect for individualized autonomy and intellectual maturity, and, thus, invite arguments for treating students differently.
Students sometimes lack the firm self-definition (assumed in
adults) to benefit from a rule protecting their self-realization. The
theory of truth-through-debate relies on a marketplace of experienced and rational consumers (again assumed in adults); such free83.
84.
85.
86.

New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
Pico, 457 U.S. at 908 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See id. at 890-91 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Hafen, supra note 12, at 718-

19.
87. Pico, 457 U.S. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
89. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-87 (2d ed. 1988). For a general discussion of these theories, see id.; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 6-20 (1970); GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1106-11 (10th ed. 1980).
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market analysis appears unrealistic in a school of young, impressionable shoppers. 9° Finally, students' interest in democratic representation declines if we assume, as the Authority model does, that
students are already represented by their parents and other adult
community members. 91
Although the Authority model correctly addresses the interests of the local community and attempts to locate a place for students within it, the model fails. Ultimately the community of
adults in this vision craves too much power. The community's role
for young people proves too subservient. The Justices who adhere
to the Authority view overemphasize discipline and respect for authority. They also underestimate the importance of teaching student participation and decision-making skills. In fact, current
research suggests that the teaching of democratic values requires
more than formal instruction, particularly where such instruction
92
differs from observations and experiences of students.
Linda McNeil, an educational researcher who has studied class
dynamics and interviewed high school teachers in the Midwest,
questions the effect of order in the classroom. Her study finds that
in schools where the administrators concern themselves mainly
with student management and control, both students and teachers
take learning less seriously. 93 Aware of the premium placed on uniformity and keeping classrooms "running smoothly," even very creative educators, McNeil argues, fall into a pattern she calls
"defensive teaching. '94 "Defensive" teachers find that the most effective way of maintaining discipline and order in the class is to
eliminate controversial or political discussions and avoid participation of students in order to cover more factual material more
quickly. 95 All this is done, ironically, so that by placating the administration, the teacher can safeguard what little autonomy over
96
the class that he still has.
In addition, many values glorified by the Authority view such
as respect, technical expertise, and obedience seem suspiciously
geared toward fostering success in the industrial marketplace
90. See Hafen, supra note 12, at 703.
91. Id. at 707.
92. See Levin, supra note 13, at 1654, n.31 (listing educational research that
favors participatory decision-making exercises over more traditional, authoritarian approaches).
93. THE HARVARD EDUCATION LETTER, Contradictionsof Control, vol. 3, at
7, (May 1987); see also L. MCNEIL, CONTRADICTION OF CONTROL: SCHOOL STRUCTURE AND SCHOOL KNOWLEDGE (1986).
94. THE HARVARD EDUCATION LETTER, supra note 93.

95. Id.
96. Id.
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rather than in the marketplace of ideas. 97 While economic competitiveness is certainly an important target in today's world, such a
goal should not eclipse the constitutional value of teaching good citizenship. Even those who believe a school's primary function is to
groom students for employment should favor a greater emphasis on
deliberative skills and civic responsibility. Tomorrow's employers
will further emphasize communicative skills and group management techniques as the American economy (particularly in its urban centers) becomes more service-oriented. 98 As manufacturers
move toward industries requiring high-level skills, they too will require employees comfortable with abstract reasoning and decisionmaking responsibilities.
Insight into social dynamics and group problem-solving
promises to benefit even those entering areas of low-technology; labor unions and industrial managers are gradually moving toward
more democratic representative structures, in which workers are
asked to assume more substantial governing roles.99 An opportunity to work, without the knowledge available to influence the politics of the workplace or the surrounding community, leads only to
worker oppression, not liberation.i ° °
Second, the Authority model overestimates the degree to which
the policies of local school boards and administrators democratically reflect the interests of students and other community members. Because of their size and diverse economic and racial
demographics, school districts may not be the responsive, intellectual republics some had thought. A survey conducted by the National Center for Education Information revealed that 81 percent of
polled school board presidents said they were greatly influenced by
the school superintendent, while only 4 percent were greatly influ97. See Giroux & McLaren, Teacher Education and the Politicsof Engagement: The Case for Democratic Schooling, 56 HARv. ED. REV. 213 (1986).
98. See Chira, Trying to Coax a Work Forcefrom the Schools of New York,
New York Times, July 30, 1989, at 5, col. 1. For instance, over half of New York
City's labor force is involved in financial services or other information-processing industries. Today many economists and educators predict New York will
face increasing difficulties in filling its employment needs from its future generation of its students. Id.
99. See COHEN & LAZERSON,

EDUCATION AND THE CORPORATE ORDER,

POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATION 373-86 (J. Karabel and A. Halsey eds.

1977); Klare, The Labor-Management CooperationsDebate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective,HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39 (1988).
100. As early as 1868, George Eliot argued this point forcefully in Felix Holt,
Radical, a fictional study of the radical labor movement in England. As Felix
Holt explains to a crowd of fellow workers, simply having the right to vote is
not enough to insure self-determination. "Whether our political power will be
any good to us now we have got, must depend entirely on the means and materials - the knowledge, ability, and honesty - we have at command." G. ELIOT,
FELIX HOLT, RADICAL (London ed., 1st printing 1868).
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enced by parent-teacher associations. 10 1 Teachers also find themselves strikingly disenfranchised from decisions concerning hiring,
the curriculum, and standards of student behavior. 10 2 Even in communities where school boards seem relatively responsive to community voices, dialogue over policy decisions, as the book censorship
cases make clear, can often be dominated by well-organized, vocal
03
minorities.
Similarly, a school's promise to strengthen the fibers of moral
cohesiveness is dubious given the diverse populations of many communities. If families in the school district really could decide on a
common set of community values or define a proper "manner of
civility," we would not see controversies over group protests in
10 4
schools or censorship of books in the classrooms.
Because the Autonomy and Authority poles of the student
speech debate do not recognize the primacy of the other's principles, we cannot reconcile these views by seeking common ground.
The Autonomy model, which justifies student rights in terms of independent rationality, should give way to a broader image of student rights - one that aims toward the welfare of the community
and promises more consistent speech protection for all. Similarly,
the Authority model's attachment to power and control must also
be questioned. We should find a new model of democratic education which can incorporate students' interest in free expression and
inquiry into the needs of the local community itself.
II.

ENGAGEMENT:

AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

So gather home these far-flung flocks, amalgamate them with the
others... and weave, without bias or seam, a cloak to clothe the City of
Athens!
-

Lysistrata

i 05

101. School Official and Public Split on Issues, Poll Finds,New York Times,
March 1, 1989, at B7. Such disparities predictably lead to differences between
what school officials and parents each want for their school. A 1987 Gallop poll,
for instance, showed that 71 percent of the public believes parents should have
the right to choose the school their child attends, while only 36 percent of
school board presidents favor this idea. Id.
102. Teachers Locked out of Most Major School Decisions, Carnegie Finds,
Education Daily 3, September 13, 1988. According to a study from the Carnegie
Foundation, only 7 percent of teachers say they are involved in hiring decisions;
63 percent have some influence over the curriculum; less than half report any
influence over standards of student behavior. Id.; see also Wood, Run Public
Schools Like Colleges, New York Times, July 26, 1990, at 23, col. 3 (Op-Ed) (arguing for a greater role for teachers in determining budgets, curriculum, and
rules of student conduct).
103. S. ARONS, supra note 6, at 65.
104. See id.
105. ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA 45 (D. Parker trans. 1964).
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Pulling students into the fold of community participation requires rethinking both educational and political objectives. John
Dewey, as well as the more modern theorists, Henry Giroux and
Peter McLaren, offer a way of understanding public education as
primarily a community-focused institution which operates through
the free sharing of diverse ideas. Together, their views promote a
particular view of government participation that carries its own set
of preconditions for an active citizenship. This type of civic virtue
takes on a legal significance when joined with a constitutional theory of democratic governance that shares these educators' commitment to community and group deliberation. This hybrid of
educational and constitutional theory provides the basis for seeing
student expression as a means of democratic preparation and participation. I call this new view of reconciling student rights and community involvement the perspective of Engagement.
A. EducationalEngagement
1.

The Purpose of Schooling

In the early part of this century, John Dewey became the first
educator to fully develop the idea of the public school as a center for
the development of a democratic citizenry.'06 In fact, both the Autonomy and the Authority models of the Supreme Court reflect
Dewey's notions concerning the importance of civic education and
the school's relationship with the community.1 0 7 Dewey believed
the first priority of a public school system in a democracy was to
teach students to be good citizens - to teach them the skills necessary for self-definition and meaningful participation in our political
system. For Dewey, being a good citizen meant more than reading
the papers and casting a vote once a year. Effective citizenship required a willingness to band together with others who had similar
interests in order to amplify their voices. Through such political,
social, or vocational associations, individuals could directly involve
themselves in shaping the social and political contours of their society. Good citizens were smart citizens, who knew how to analyze,
socialize, and persuade.
Dewey knew that such social skills and political savvy did not
sprout from the citizenry spontaneously. He also knew that such an
important entitlement as citizenship could not be left to the cultiva106. See generally J. DEWEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION (1909). The
following description of John Dewey's educational beliefs are taken primarily
from J. DEWEY, EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY (1916) and J. DEWEY, MORAL
PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION (1909).

107. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672, 681 (1986)
(emphasizing role of education in training students to participate in democracy); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969) (same).

1991]

Civic Virtue and the Protection of Student Voice

tion of private (and sometimes inaccessible) institutions. "[Ilt is the
right of each individual," wrote Dewey, "to have a voice in the making of social policies as, indeed, he has a vote in the determination of
political affairs. If this be true, education is primarily a public
business."'10 8
Dewey believed the best way to nurture the skills and values of
civic participation was to create a miniature democratic society
within the school itself. This inner community would reflect the
political and social processes of the external community. Schools
were more than bootcamps for industrial or corporate labor markets. They were greenhouses for an empowered citizenry. Students (guided by skilled and free-thinking instructors) would learn
to analyze the complexities of their world through application of
logical and ethical principles. They would learn to see themselves
as autonomous actors and as catalysts for social reform.
The first step in the education process focused on helping students define themselves as unique individuals in the context of a
pluralist society. Through a guided process of self-inquiry, teachers
would encourage students to examine their moral and political
preferences, and to discover how these preferences fit into contemporary discourse. This assertion of self-identity is so important that
Lawrence Kohlberg, who has drawn extensively from Dewey's
work, writes that "'the development of free and powerful character' "is, in fact, the "democratic educational end for all humans."' 0 9
This "free and powerful character" could be nurtured through guidance and intellectual challenge, but it could not be authoritatively
imposed. "Regarding freedom," wrote Dewey, "the important thing
to bear in mind is that it designates a mental attitude rather than
external unconstraint of movements, but this quality of mind cannot develop without fair leeway of movements in exploration, experimentation, application, etc." 110
Having directed student inquiry inwards, Dewey next asked
students to inject their unique personalities into the external political world. By teaching the vision and social relationships necessary
to critical democracy, Dewey hoped schools would encourage students to bring their experiences to legislatures and voting booths in
order to improve the quality of government. "To an extent characteristics of no other institution save that of the state itself," wrote
111
Dewey, "the school has the power to modify the social order."'
108. J. DEWEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 106, at v-vi.
109. Kohlberg & Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education, 42

HARV.

ED. REV. 449, 493 (1972).

110. J. DEWEY,
111. J. DEWEY,

EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY 305 (1916).
MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION v (1909); see also J. DEWEY,
THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM AND THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY (1956); J.
DEWEY, CREATIVE DEMOCRACY - THE TASK BEFORE Us, reprintedin CLASSIC
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Dewey's theory of education sows the seeds for a view of Engagement that will emphasize the role of civic education as a means
of fulfillment and community transformation. But his analysis is
only a starting point. Like the Autonomy view, Dewey's vision celebrates the free-wheeling spirit of the individual in society. He sees
associational forums more as amplifiers of collective self-interest
than as spawning groups for new worldviews. Democratic schools
for Dewey ultimately provide a means of protecting or realizing a
future vested right in autonomous choice in the adult world. To a
lesser extent, his vision also accents the school's unique relationship
with the community and suggests some common level of understanding between the values of liberty and the collective interests of
local communities. Indirectly, Dewey's theory also points to the importance of moral reasoning in the process of training youth for
citizenship.
In a nation preoccupied with instability in the Middle East, Savings and Loan scams, and 2 Live Crew, parents today are rightfully
concerned with the values society conveys to its young people.
Many parents if given the choice, would demand moral education in
the schools. 112 But incorporating moral lessons into an educational
program designed to suit everyone can be difficult. Because public
school attendance is often the only realistic option to compulsory
education laws, public schools have aspired to instruction that is
beneficial, yet inoffensive to all. We have been led to think of public school teachers as promoters of universally accepted truths and
developers of unbiased, cognitive skills. Morals have little to do
with universality or cognitive deduction. Indeed, morals exercise
such force in our lives exactly because they spring from the most
personal and intuitive parts of ourselves. Not surprisingly, parents,
at various points on the political spectrum, have challenged school
113
lessons which convey moral values with which they disagree.
Commentators have proposed a variety of educational and legal
114
mechanisms for keeping public school education morally neutral.
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS 389-94
AND DEMOCRACY 305 (1916).

(Max Fisch ed. 1951); J. DEWEY,

EDUCATION

112. A 1987 Gallup poll showed that 43% of the 1,571 respondents questioned
agreed that values and ethical behavior should be taught in public schools.
Hand, Democracy 101, New York Times, April 9, 1989, at 54, col. 2.
113. Public school environmental programs, for instance, have led to mild
debates over the appropriateness of hunting and trapping, on one hand, and the
more radical "deep ecology" approach to environmentalism on the other. See
Johnson, In Schools, New Emphasis on Environment, The New York Times,
Nov. 21, 1989, at 21, col. 2. Schools attempting to inject civics lessons on Middle
Eastern politics and history inevitably find themselves under fire from parents
on both sides of the Persian Gulf issue, see Celis, supra note 11.
114. Lawrence Kohlberg has led the way in exploring pedagogical approaches to moral neutrality in education. See L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981). Legal proposals for moral neutrality in educa-
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Yet for any educational scheme that sincerely aspires toward selfdevelopment and social reform, the conveyance of values seems
both necessary and inevitable.
Facing headlines ranging from surrogate motherhood, to
apartheid, to the "greenhouse effect," we are acutely aware of how
closely related personal identity, politics, and morality can be.
Schools cannot prepare students to interpret their democratic community and to seek positive change within it, without first equipping them with the tools of moral deliberation and persuasion.
Recognition of our own moral presumptions and those of others,
enables us to understand and communicate our concerns in political
contexts. An acceptance of intuitive values also promotes governmental stability. Without the awareness of competing moral imperatives, our society could never tolerate widespread dissent. For the
same reason, minorities could never convince majorities to adopt
their interests or to consider their moral point of view. As Amy
Gutmann explains:
These two facts about our lives - that we disagree about what is moral
and that we face hard moral choices as individuals even when we agree
as a group - are the basis for an argument that democratic citizens
learn to think about morality as a necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition
for their being moral and sharing political sovereignty
115
as equals.

Because the capacity for moral reasoning is so essential to self-identity as well as to political discourse, democratic schools should not
116
duck the responsibility of imparting values to students.
Dr. Robert Coles, a professor of psychiatry and medical humanities, also emphasizes the importance of moral education in his
work. He laments that students today often pick up the wrong
moral lessons from adults and peers. 117 In a continuing survey on
young people and morality, Coles notes that student values are increasingly marked by self-interest and a refusal (or inability) to extion include: Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied PoliticalEstablishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); van Geel, The Search for the
ConstitutionalLimits on Government Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 197 (1983).
115. Gutmann, DemocraticSchools and Moral Education, 1 NOTRE DAME J.
OF LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 461-62 (1985).
116. Some argue that although the teaching of morals is important, it is better left to the family. Yet as Gutmann warns, we cannot depend on individual
families to impart the values most necessary for life in a pluralist democracy.
In fact they are likely to do just the opposite by emphasizing the personal and
localized concerns of the particular family unit while deemphasizing concerns
of social groups different from themselves. Such localized lessons are not necessarily undesirable so long as the values essential to social discourse and political tolerance are taught somewhere else, in this case, the school. Id. at 464.
117. See Hechinger, About Education: A Survey Suggests that Children Are
Quick Learners When It Comes to Ethical Shortcuts, New York Times, Sept. 26,
1990, at B6.
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press guilt or shame. 1 8 Among other findings, his survey reports
that sixty-five percent of high school students would try to cheat on
a test, and that sixty percent of all students surveyed rely on moral
standards that have, as their main purpose, self-gratification. 119
Coles links these attitudes to today's "highly competitive, SAT-conscious" student culture and to examples set by an outside world
often preoccupied with pragmatism and profit. 120 Significantly,
Coles' survey finds that most students define their values by listening to one another and watching what goes on around them.12 ' The
power of adult authority figures to shape (or impose) morality is
diminishing. 22
At least part of this decline in "moral literacy" stems from the
trend in public schools to avoid controversial issues of community
values and morality. But by ceasing to acknowledge moral issues,
schools do not cease to teach morality; they simply become oblivious
to the moral lessons they convey. As Coles' research suggests,
adults' most powerful influence over moral growth of children occurs when they do not even intend it - when they are setting
examples.
It is almost impossible for a school to achieve real neutrality in
values. Schools are, after all, products of their own institutional
23
role and historical context. Proponents of "Values Clarification,'
who claim to encourage students to locate and embrace their own
personal moral code, inevitably promote certain values (tolerance,
124
self-inquiry) over others (chauvinism, unquestioned allegiance).
Even schools that do not aim toward any one pedagogical technique
convey values. Corporal punishment, textbook selection, or student-body elections all convey subtle lessons about discipline, objectivity, and speech. Even frog dissections in biology classrooms can
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The survey finds that even though 82% of young children believe in God
and nearly 40% say daily prayers, only 3% said they would seek out a member
of the clergy for help with a moral problem. While one-third believe that their
teachers care about them, only 7% said they would turn to them for advice in a
matter of personal values. Id.
123. See L. KOHLBERG, supra note 114, for an overview of the aims of "Values Clarification".
124. A number of critics of "Values Clarification" in general and of Lawrence Kohlberg in particular have levelled this objection. See, e.g., Gutmann,
supra note 115; R. Peters, Why Doesn'tLawrence Kohlberg Do His Homework?
reprinted in MORAL EDUCATION, IT COMES WITH THE TERRITORY 288-90 (D.
Purpel & K. Ryan eds. 1976) [hereinafter MORAL EDUCATION]; Fraenkel, The
Kohlberg Bandwagon: Some Reservations,reprinted in MORAL EDUCATION 291308; J. Stewart, Clarifying Values Clarification: A Critique, reprinted in
VALUE THEORY AND EDUCATION 215-225 (P. Carbone ed. 1987).
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take on a particular moral meaning. 125
As society becomes more complicated - as drugs, handguns,
and corporate dollars infiltrate the classroom - values do too. Students attending some high schools in New York City thread their
way through metal detectors and x-ray machines before entering
school buildings. 126 Teenagers in Knoxville, Tennessee begin each
day with a commercially funded satellite news broadcast, complete
127
with paid advertisements for dandruff shampoo and candy bars.
In the San Francisco Bay Area, a local high school, with the help of
students, has opened its own 7-Eleven outlet on campus. 128 From
electronic searches to subsidized Slurpees, a school's response to
cultural and social realities inevitably extends a moral point of
view. In the words of education theorists, Purpel and Ryan, "it
comes with the territory.'

1 29

While schools should be careful not to impose moral views

tightly bound to religious or politically partisan agendas, educators
should not shy from encouraging the process of moral deliberation
that lead to civic virtue. Borrowing from Dewey's approach, we begin to see more of the values that the Engagement model would
promote. Schools of Engagement would structure their curricula to
emphasize the importance of political participation in relation to individual social experience. While seriously acknowledging a
school's role in preparing students for employment, schools of Engagement would downplay simple materialism and self-gratification. They would encourage cooperation, tolerance, and ingenuity.
Perhaps most important from a student-speech perspective, the
school of Engagement would favor a strong presumption for communication as a means of resolving differences.
125. Last year an animal rights group protested a Brooklyn school's policy
allowing animal dissection in the classroom. Protestors accused the school of
forcing students to "take part in a system in which animals are subjected to
torture and death." Animal Protest Blamed for Damage, New York Times,
June 13, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
126. Detection Methods Raise Issue of Student Rights, New York Times, Jan.
10, 1990, at B9, col. 1. Security programs using metal detectors and x-ray machines now operate in 14 high schools and one junior high school in New York.
Id.
127. Today, Class, We'l Learn About Soap, NEWSWEEK, March 20, 1989, at
62-63; Teaching by TV, Boston Globe, March 7, 1989, at 1. Other programs between public schools and private companies such as I.B.M., General Electric,
and Du Pont have caused some educators to worry about the effects large probusiness groups may have on the curriculum. Deutsch, Corporate Takeovers?,
New York Times, Aug. 6, 1989, at 42, col. 2.
128. Today, Class, We'll Learn About Soap, supra note 127, at 63.
129. D. Purpel and K. Ryan, What Is It and Where Are We? reprinted in
MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 124, at 3-10, 9; see also D. Purpel and K. Ryan, It
Comes with the Territory, reprinted in MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 124, at
44-55; Gutmann, supra note 115, at 463; P. JACKSON, LIFE IN THE CLASSROOMS

(1968).
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At this point, we have defined schools as centers for individual
and societal improvement. We have also proposed a number of abstract moral values that could support these ends. Our next step is
to find a specific model of teaching that would encourage effective
civic virtue in today's societal context. As teachers know, the very
process of teaching can define the substance of the lesson.
2. The Method of Schooling
130
In an essay primarily devoted to the education of teachers,
Giroux and McLaren embrace Dewey's notion of democratic education as a means of self-definition and social reform, but offer contemporary insight and innovation. They argue that in order to
cultivate citizens for a more "critical democracy," students should
be encouraged to question more and to take more responsibility for
their actions. Giroux and McLaren explore the role of authority in
the classroom and suggest ways in which teachers can exercise it in
a way that "emancipates" students. 1 3 1 Finally, Giroux and McLaren define the process of democratic education as one that engages the voices of teachers, students, and other community
1 32
members in a pursuit of the common good.

Giroux and McLaren preface their discussion by noting that,
sadly enough, the majority of today's public schools have abandoned
even the most diluted efforts to foster citizenship in the classroom.
They find current discourse among practitioners bereft of any serious attempts to democratize schools or politically empower students. 1 33 Giroux and McLaren point to the findings of Barbara
Finkelstein. In 1984 she wrote:
Contemporary reformers seem to be recalling public education from its
traditional utopian mission-to nurture a critical and committed citizenry that would stimulate the processes of political and cultural
transformations and redefine and extend the workings of political de-

mocracy ....Reformers seem to imagine public schools as economic
rather than political instrumentalities. They forge no new visions of
political possibilities. Instead,34they call public schools to industrial and
cultural service exclusively.'

Finkelstein's observations continue to hold true. Throughout
the 1980s, state and federal educational reports justified educational
reform almost exclusively in economic terms. 135 Contemporary re130. Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97, at 218.
131. See id. at 215, 224-5.
132. Id. at 234-35.
133. Id. at 217-22.
134. Id. at 217 (quoting Finkelstein, Education and the Retreatfrom Democracy in the United States, 1979-198?, 86 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 280-81
(1984)).
135. See, e.g., A NATION AT RISK, supra note 12, at 7 ("If only to keep and
improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must
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formers, originally spurred by the "Reagan Revolution," switched
the educational focus from civic responsibility to a set of narrowly
defined labor market objectives. 136 President Bush is projecting
this same focus into the 1990s. A statement issued after the president's historic "Education Summit" in 1989 with the nation's governors, emphasized only the goals of national prosperity and
economic competitiveness, and did not mention the role of educa137
tion in strengthening political citizenship.
Today's educational emphasis on economic competitiveness is
significant in two ways. From an educational theorist's' point of
view, the current movement in educational reform suggests an upside-down version of Dewey's model: instead of public schools reshaping the political and economic foundations of the external
world, economic incentives of the external world are shaking the
foundations of the public schools. This continued trend in valuing
earning above learning threatens our very political structure and
drives Giroux and McLaren to recast Dewey's ideas in more radical
terms. From a legal point of view, this trend in educational reform
indicates a flaw in the reasoning of recent student-speech cases.
Both the Autonomy and Authority factions of the Court have decided speech disputes as if the defendant schools really acknowledged their civic roles in the democratic process. 138 Today's
educational priorities argue against allowing schools more discretionary power over student speech. Without even a vague commitment to civic education to guide school policy, a school's unchecked
control of speech is likely to prove even more arbitrary.
According to Giroux and McLaren, equipping students with the
knowledge and skill to live in a critical democracy requires an educational environment that welcomes both creative reasoning and
voices of student experience. Because the social order of the
outside world has such potential to influence education within the
classroom, Giroux and McLaren seek to revive critical evaluation in
the classroom. Students, they argue, should learn to examine curdedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system."); NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, Time for Results: The Governors'1991 Report on Education 2 (1986) ("To meet stiff competition from workers in the rest of the world,
we must educate ourselves and our children as never before.").
136. See authorities cited supra note 135.
137. See "A Jeffersonian Compact": The Statement by the President and
Governors, New York Times, Sept. 1, 1989, at 22, col. 2. The summit's statement
also neglects to mention any role of the students in further defining these goals.
In describing a task-force operation to recommend more specific educational
goals, the summit leaders said the process would involve "teachers, parents, local school administrators, school board members, elected officials, business and
labor communities and the public at large." Students were not mentioned. See
id.
138. See supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text discussing civic education
in the Autonomy Model.
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rent political and economic institutions and be encouraged to imagine what alternative forms might look like. Because democracy is
an inherently active process, Giroux and McLaren invite students
to confront and analyze social differences and diverse points of
view. 139 They should learn to engage in critical analysis and make
choices about morally appropriate behavior. 140 To learn the process
of democracy, students must be allowed to test their assumptions
and conclusions. They must learn first hand the consequences and
responsibilities of free choice.
Teachers can direct students, but should allow students to
make their own choices and implement them. Although teachers
should use their authority to promote the values of critical inquiry
and social justice, they should take care not to mystify knowledge.
Rather, they should question how knowledge is produced and distributed. In the words of Kohlberg and Meyer, "[t]he democratic
educator must be guided by a set of psychological and ethical principles which he openly presents to his students, inviting criticism as
141
well as understanding.'
For Giroux and McLaren, the key to unlocking the secrets of
democracy is not merely the promotion of student experimentation
and inquiry, but the injection of student voice.' 42 Giroux and McLaren pay special attention to dialogue. For them, communication
is both a means for students to define themselves as individuals and
a way to incorporate their values into the schools, thus shaping
143
their communities.
Voice, quite simply, refers to the various measures by which students
and teachers actively participate in dialogue. It is related to the discursive means whereby teachers and students attempt to make themselves "heard" and to define themselves as active authors of their
worlds. Displaying voice means,
to cite Mikhail Bakhtin, "retelling a
144
story in one's own words.'

We define ourselves only within the context of other human beings.
Through self-expression we assert our own class, culture, and racial
identities. 145 By articulating our experiences to others, being listened to and understood, we define ourselves as participants in a
46
common society and empower ourselves.
139. Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97, at 225.
140. Id.
141. Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 109, at 494; see also Giroux & McLaren,
supra note 97, at 226.
142. See Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97, at 235-37.
143. Id.
144. Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97, at 235 (citing H. Rosen, The Importance of Story, 63 LANGUAGE ARTS 234 (1986)).

145. Id. at 235-37.
146. See id. at 235-37.
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Voice also allows students to bridge the gap between their
world and the world of the teacher and administrators. The students remind the teacher that the classroom is socially constructed,
historically determined, and reproduced through institutionalized
relationships of class, gender, race, and power. In order for teachers to teach, they must understand the values the students enter
with.
Finally, voice provides the opportunity for incorporation and
transformation. Educators must work to broaden the experience in
the classroom since the school often speaks (metaphorically and,
perhaps literally) with only one accent. 147 This links the school
with the histories and experiences of the outside community. It allows students to evaluate participatory democracy in a context and
1 48
allows them to relate the ideal of democracy to the real thing.
The standpoint of the community's members should be the starting
place for social critique.
Although the teaching method of Giroux and McLaren affirms
Dewey's mandate for democratic schooling, it differs from Dewey's
plan in several respects. First, Giroux and McLaren acknowledge
that both the school and outside community forces have the potential to act upon each other, sometimes to unequal extents. 149 They
would not only encourage teachers and administrators to push for
democratic reform within the schools, but would push for such re50
form in other institutions as well.1
Second, in an effort to broaden their research for creative democracy, Giroux and McLaren recognize students as full-fledged
participants in political reform at the moment they join the school
community.' 5 1 Thus, the authors expand the field of politics to include not only the ballot boxes and town halls, but also the classrooms and the schoolyards.
Third, the authors dramatically extend the spectrum of student
dialogue to encompass communication with teachers and other
community members.' 5 2 This innovation underscores the importance of cultural and class experience in the community and transforms school policymakiig into a more deliberative process. Also,
the notion of democratic dialogue as including the voices of teachers
and students creates a presumption that channels for such communication be provided within the curriculum itself.
147.
(1984).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See A.

BRIrAN

& M. MAYNARD, SEXISM, RACISM AND OPPRESSION

Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97, at 237.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 238.
See id. at 235-37.
Id. at 236-37.
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Finally, Giroux and McLaren's emphasis on the inclusion of
minority experience in teaching suggests a more active role for a
mediating teacher.l5 3 For example, if a class planned to discuss a
topic of community interest and no students could articulate the
minority perspectives, a teacher would furnish readings or other
materials that provided these perspectives. This idea suggests an
argument against broad censorship policies in school curricula since
censored books often contain the perspectives of political or cul54
tural minorities.
Admittedly, we are a far cry away from Justice Black's cool
observation that children are in school "to learn, not teach."'1 55 But
real attempts to incorporate student contributions into school policy
have achieved remarkable results. One of the most striking examples of a program blending both participatory democracy and morality is found in one of the least likely places: Theodore Roosevelt
High School in the South Bronx of New York.156 In this school,
serving a student body drawn from 26 different immigrant groups
and plagued with problems of drugs, broken homes, and teen pregnancy, administrators have set up an experiment in self-governance
called the "just community."
In this program, "communities" consisting of 5 teachers and 100
students meet once a week to discuss issues which typically range in
importance from field trips to student discipline and drugs. The
meetings work very much like the traditional town meeting. Members exchange points of view, appoint committees and task forces,
and decide matters by open vote. The majority rules. Applying
such democratic principles is not easy. Meetings are often draining
on students and teachers. As in other democratic forums, discussions sometimes bog down and prevent speedy action.'57 But by almost all accounts, Roosevelt's just community has succeeded in
producing a less violent and more involved learning environment.
One student who had repeated ninth grade twice because of truancy
153. See id. at 222-24.

154. For instance, in Pico, the Island Trees school board elected to ban the
following books, among others: BEST SHORT STORIES NEGRO WRITERS (L. Langston Hughes ed. 1967); R. WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE
(1967); and ANONYMOUS, Go ASK ALICE (1971). Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-57 n.3.

155. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting).

156. The following description of Roosevelt High's democracy experiment is
taken from Hand, Morality Lessons? Hear!Hear!, New York Times, April 9,
1989, at 53, col 1, and Democracy 101, New York Times, April 9, 1989, at 54, col.

2.
157. School members tell the story of one just community - made up of
school truants - that entered into a protracted meeting to establish rules for a
field trip to a state park. They eventually agreed to a rule prohibiting weapons,
fighting, radios, and sex, but only after a minority favoring weapons and sex
finally gave in. Hand, supra note 156.
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problems, commented that Roosevelt's program compelled her to
change. After attending day and night classes throughout the
school year and into the summer, she is now a senior and describes
herself as a "role model" to others. Experienced teachers at the
school note that they too have become more tolerant and fairer as a
result of the program.
The "just community" program came in response to public demand for moral education in the schools. The experiment draws
from the work of Lawrence Kohlberg who believed that moral development hinges on the notion of justice. The two prerequisites to
moral development, according to one researcher supervising the
program, are to listen and appreciate. Roosevelt High dramatically
proves that deliberative democracy works not only in learning laboratories or polite communities, but in real urban areas where social
forces often isolate and dispossess its members.1 5 s
In less dramatic ways, other programs throughout the country
affirm this point. Administrators in two urban California schools,
for instance, found they could reduce alarming truancy rates only
after consulting formally with faculty and students. 159 Before such
talks, the schools had tried everything from detention programs to
160
plainclothes police officers - all with unsuccessful results.
Other schools have found student input significantly helpful in
161
curbing gang conflict and drugs on campus.
Student mediation groups have proved successful in signifi1 62
cantly reducing suspension rates and fighting in urban schools.
Students involved in dispute resolution programs are often more
likely to understand the feeling of the disputants and to see areas of
common ground than are their adult counterparts. 163 The programs empower disobedient students and student mediators (many
of whom were problem students themselves) to resolve disputes
164
without adult authority figures dictating results.
158. Kohlberg's notions of justice and morality have previously inspired
democratic learning experiments in smaller, more affluent schools in Massachusetts and Scarsdale, New York. Roosevelt High's program is the first to extensively apply such theories to a so-called "problem" school. See Hand, supra
note 156.
159. Orderly Classroomsand Corridors: Why Some Schools Have Them and
Others Don't, Harvard Education Letter, vol. 3. no. 5, Sept. 1987, at 1-2.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also S. Hall, Student Discipline: Can You and Your Child's
Teacher Agree?, Network for Public Schools, vol. 14, at 5-6 (1988).
162. Brenner, Talking Their Way Out of Trouble, New York Times, Oct. 22,
1989, at 1, col. 4; HARVARD EDUCATION LETTER, Talking It Out: Students Mediate Disputes, vol. 5, at 4 (Jan./Feb. 1989).
163. HARVARD EDUCATION LETTER, Talking It Out: Students Mediate Disputes, vol. 5, at 4 (Jan./Feb. 1989).
164. Id.
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Educators are finding that students can learn much from each
other in academic settings as well. Research demonstrates that students actually understand topics better if they learn them as part of
a collaborative effort with other students. 165 The line between
teaching and learning is fading.
The central message of the Engagement view is that group dialogue helps students define their personal identities and collective
interests. Such dialogues supply a catalyst for social transformation
within the school and in the external community. The corollary to
this is that student voices must be heard not only by other students,
but by teachers, and administrators. Once heard, students must
then be responded to. Through the lens of Engagement the "right"
to speech is much more than an individual entitlement to respect of
one's autonomy. It is recognition of one's membership in an interconnected human community devoted to learning through inclu1 66
sions of diverse experiences.
B. ConstitutionalEngagement
The model of Engagement offers more than a prescription for
better teaching in a democracy. It reconceptualizes what democracy should be. It asks citizens to aspire to a richer, more participatory role in social reform. In its revision of the democratic
ideal, the Engagement model sets forth a new set of preconditions
for the guarantees of self-rule under the Constitution. In the tradition of Barnette, Tinker, and the Pico plurality, this model argues
for granting its new approach to educational democracy as a constitutional mandate. We can find support for this more communitarian approach in the recent revival of constitutional discourse known
167
as civic republicanism.
Civic republicanism recasts democratic policymaking as a reasoned, public dialogue about the public good. It rejects the more
widely accepted pluralist model which sees political decision mak165. HARVARD EDUCATION LETTER, CooperativeLearningat 4-6 (Sept. 1986);
EducatorsSay Those Who Learn Together Learn Better, Boston Globe, April 12,
1989, at B23.
166. See Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE
L.J. 1860, 1874 (1987).
167. The republican civic tradition has recently spawned a number of discussions and interpretations. The brand of civic republicanism referred to in this
article draws mainly from the work of Frank Michelman and Cass R. Sunstein.
See Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic]; Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Michelman, Politics of Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979)
[hereinafter Michelman, Politics of Values]; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
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168
ing as competition among private interests for self-satisfaction.
Government, reconceived in republican terms, is the result of
groups of individuals of differing interests and perspectives vocalizing their interests and inviting others to respond. 169 Ideally, the
results they reach will not represent any one interest of a majority
faction, but rather a group interest that reflects consideration of
majority and minority interests. 170 Republican self-government relies on three primary principles: deliberation, a belief in a common
good, and broad civic participation.

Deliberation refers to a method of policymaking based on rationality and group consensus. When legislators, voters, or even
school board members join to form policies that affect others, they
should aspire toward a process of what Paul Brest has called, "discursive participation."' 171 According to Brest, discursive participation "induces us to listen to other people's positions and justify our
own" and "induces us to assume the 'moral point of view' that lies
at the heart of most ethical-political systems. ' 172 Although the responsibility to fashion policy through deliberation ideally falls on
the policymakers themselves, 173 some republicans emphasize the
role of the courts in striking legislative or executive enactments
174
which do not reflect deliberative origins.
An aspiration for this sort of deliberative process presumes a
citizenry devoted to seeking a common good. While members of society will certainly disagree with the substantive nature of that
good, they must at least accept this group decisionmaking process.
Republicans, therefore, believe that the government has a special
interest in inculcating political values such as empathy, community
membership, and a willingness to participate. 175 While pluralist education in the Autonomy model might encourage acts of individual
fulfillment, the Engagement model, following a republican tack,
would encourage the fulfillment of group empowerment. Like
Dewey and Giroux and McLaren, republicans see the teaching of
civic virtue as both a means of social reform and as a means of selfrealization. 176 As Frank Michelman describes it, "[p]olitical engagement is considered a positive human good because the self is
understood as partially constituted by or as coming to itself through
168. Sunstein, supra note 167, at 1544.
169. Id. at 1541.
170. Id. at 1544.
171. Brest, FurtherBeyond the Republican Revival: Radical Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624 (1988).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Sunstein, supra note 167, at 1579.
175. Id. at 1556.
176. See id. at 1550; see also Michelman, Politics of Values, supra note 167.
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1 77
such engagement."'
To insure that political deliberation reflects broad consensus,
republicans seek to include as wide a range of citizen participation
as they can. Unlike the eighteenth-century notion of republicanism
popular among anti-federalists, the new republicanism does not
seek to replace diverse group perspectives in favor of a single, universal worldview. Instead it embraces social plurality as a political
good and reaches far to include the "silenced voices of emergently
self-conscious social groups.' x 78 Because republican politics embrace the perspectives of all its members, it naturally lays the foundation for genuine community and produces just laws and a just
179
society.
The necessity of including so many diverse perspectives, some
necessarily on the fringe, presents a problem for civic republicans,
since not all groups command as much attention as others. Advocates of republicanism, therefore, favor broad access to the media
and argue that modes of communication in the political process
should not be monopolized by one faction of powerful citizens.' 80
Further, republicans attempt, in at least two ways, to include people
not involved in the formal political process. First, they seek to annex the interests and perspectives voiced in extra-political groups.
For Michelman, such groups include, social organizations, workplaces, and, significantly, public and private schools.' 8 ' Second,
they expand the boundaries of politics itself to include "social life at
large."'18 2 By observing activity and debate in such quasi-political
forums, republicans encourage formal policymakers - who may
not have certain minorities represented in their ranks - to understand and incorporate the interests of less prominent groups.

Whether such procedural fine-tuning can insure true republi18 3
canism in all facets of democratic society remains open to debate.
Yet this process of political annexation seems especially well-suited
to the system of public schools. School boards are generally small,
devoted to a singular purpose, and already understood as functioning for the common good of students and the community as a
177. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 167, at 1503.
178. Id. at 1529.
179. See Brest, supra note 171, at 1624.
180. Sunstein, supra note 167, at 1552, 1578.
181. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 167, at 1531.
182. Id.
183. For commentary pointing to weaknesses in civic republican theory related to this issue, see Epstein, Modern Republicanism - Or the Nlight from
Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633 (1988); Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political
PartyPerspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process,136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1567 (1988); Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1673 (1988).
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whole.' 8 4 Further, smaller voluntary associations composed of parents and teachers are already in place to inform the public dialogue.
Although school boards have every potential to serve as civic
republican institutions, they are not there yet. A school board devoted to discursive participation should seek to incorporate the
views of the entire school community. In expansive terms, that includes nearly anyone whom the educational program affects: parents, teachers, administrators, employers, politicians, and students.
As we saw in Part I of this essay, school boards currently are likely
to incorporate the needs of school administrators and employers,
but not those of parents, teachers, and students. Parents and teachers at least have formal channels, such as P.T.A. groups and the
ballot, to voice their views to school administrators. Yet school systems exclude any formal dialogue with the one "marginal" voice
that means the most and is the least politically powerful: that of
the students.
Students, forever on the margins, cannot be said to have political ambassadors either in their parents or teachers. Parents may
not adequately represent students since many nowadays find themselves not only out of touch with the schools, but with their children. Even a parent who accurately champions a child's individual
interests will not necessarily represent her interests as a member of
a student community. Teachers may better understand the needs
and perspectives of student groups; but without a formal mechanism of dialogue between teachers and students, deep understandings will not occur.
The obvious solution is for school board members to embrace
the perspective of students by annexing them into the political dialogue. Although "colonizing" some extra-political institutions for
republican aims can raise substantial problems, 8 5 we should have
no fear of incorporating student dialogue in school board politics:
schools are ideally geared toward political transformation, virtue,
and the public good. Civic republicanism fits naturally with the
theories of education we have just reviewed. It affirms, in a constitutional context, the preconditions of government assumed by Giroux and McLaren's educational theory. Civic republicanism also
promises to pull a student body devoted to civic virtue into the life
of the larger community. As a union of progressive educational theory and republican politics, the Engagement model, then, would envision two levels of discursive participation.
The first level involves the interior community of the school
itself. There, school officials would provide students with channels
184. See Brest, supra note 171, at 1629-30 (discussing apparent virtues of a
public school district in the civic republican perspective).
185. See Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988).
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of group communication. They would encourage students to define
their identities and group interests through an exchange of experiences and cultural values. Teachers would play an active role in
directing discourse, smoking out underlying principles inherent in
student viewpoints, and reaching to include minority voices that
would otherwise remain silent. Where outside materials, such as
literature or film, affirm existing perspectives, or offer additional
ones, teachers and students would have the freedom to inject those
messages into discussions as well. These moments of deliberative
engagement would not be confined to classroom discussions, but
would include dialogue in school-sponsored newspapers, musical recitals, dramatic presentations, and other broad forms of student
communications. The primary purposes of this directed dialogue on
the school level would be to prepare students to participate in deliberative democracy and to instill civic values such as empathy, responsibility, and tolerance.
The second level of political engagement in this model would
occur in the broader community of the school district. There,
school board members, administrators, teachers, parents, other
adult community members, and students would, ideally, contribute
to the policies of the schools. At the very least, formal policymakers would work to incorporate the interests and perspectives of the
other community members in constructing new policy. The challenges of today's school boards include a number of problems gang violence, drug abuse, and teen pregnancy. These are all
closely related to the social environment that young people live in.
Formal policymakers in the community should be made aware of
the choices various students perceive in their world and the solutions they, themselves, might favor. Student deliberation and dialogue through journalism, music, and other means of selfexpression can provide teachers and administrators with that
unique insight of the students.
Parents, administrators, and other members of the school community should not object to student voice on the grounds that free
expression of youth undermines other community interests in order, tradition, and economic prosperity. Stronger student speech
protection does not mean more traditional values must be abandoned, only that adults must convince students, by appealing to reason, to accept them voluntarily. Also, as we have seen earlier,
preparation for tomorrow's labor markets will require students
versed in the skills of communication and decisionmaking.' 8 6 Today, schools that attempt to grant students true participation in the
development of policy find that order and discipline are easier to
186. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion on worker
apprehension caused by insufficient knowledge.
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The second level of the Engagement model would view schoolsponsored student dialogue as a direct means of political expression
and reform. In contrast to the Autonomy model, student speech
proves more than a reward for individual and intellectual maturity.
Departing from Dewey's earlier theory, student speech is more
than a nurturing of a future, vested right in political participation.
Rather, speech is a means of preparation and actualization. Speech
signifies one's present membership in the local community.
In this section, we have examined the more abstract and farflung territory of educational politics; we are about to return to the
more concrete world of East Hazelwood High in order to apply the
principles of Engagement. The Engagement model provides a very
powerful and expansive notion of democratic education. In an effort to place this discussion in an appropriate context for Part III, I
should make two points. First, both the educational and political
components of the Engagement theory are offered as prescriptions,
not descriptions. Certainly the happenings in a tenth-grade classroom have never, and may never resemble the politics of the Athenian city-state. Nor do school boards, as currently conceived, reach
regular moments of discursive participation. Yet schools are, perhaps uniquely, the place for aspirations and ideals. By learning to
strive for political discussions in the community's interest, students
learn the civic principles that lie beneath their communications,
even when their responses seem misguided or inarticulate. By requiring school officials to confront the collective expression of students, the Engagement model encourages policymakers to consider
student views when they otherwise might not.
Second, although this essay only addresses the protection of
school-sponsored student speech, the Engagement model logically
leads to much greater and expansive reforms in education. Giroux
and McLaren explicitly argue for deep reforms in pedagogical and
administrative approaches to public education. 188 One could use
the principles of civic republicanism to reform a number of educational issues, including student discipline, unequal school financing,
and bilingual education. The broader implications of Engagement,
however, should not distract us from a more specific effort to
strengthen student speech. A movement towards a more civicminded educational process correctly begins with opening the channels of dialogue.
187. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text for a discussion on different schools' attempts at granting students true participation.

188. Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97.
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ENGAGING THE SPECTRUM

We must say it all, and as clearly as we can.
18 9
Horses Make a Landscape Look More Beautiful

-

A.

The Trouble with Hazelwood

Examining student speech cases through the lens of Engagement helps us see the development and the dangers in the Supreme
Court's most recent decision concerning student speech: Hazelwood
v. Kuhlmeier. The Hazelwood decision revives the conflict between
autonomous rights and educational authority. As a solution the Hazelwood Court attempts to insulate each interest from the other by
splitting the school into curricular and non-curricular forums. Each
is subject to different degrees of protection from state influence.
Because the Hazelwood decision does not acknowledge strong
speech interests in and outside the formal curriculum, the Court's
approach is fundamentally at odds with the politics of Engagement.
Its reasoning threatens to undermine full civic participation by current and future citizens.
Hazelwood holds that the first amendment allows a school to
delete objectionable articles from a student-run newspaper that is
published as part of a high school journalism class. 19° What is remarkable about Hazelwood is not so much the ultimate decision
(although that in itself marks a decline in student protection) but
the way the Court reaches the decision.
Justice White, writing for the majority, examines the free
speech question at East Hazelwood High School by setting up a twopart analysis. First, he asks whether Hazelwood has opened Spectrum "by policy or practice" as a public forum. 191 Justice White
finds that Spectrum was produced as part of a supervised, curricular
offering, dismissing evidence of a school board policy favoring free
speech as well as evidence that the newspaper staff published with
an understanding of first amendment protection. 192 As part of the
curriculum, the Court emphasizes that the newspaper does not constitute a public forum. 193 Accordingly, school officials may regulate
194
the contents of Spectrum in "any reasonable manner."
In the second part of his analysis, Justice White finds that
Tinker - which provides stronger protection of student speech 189. A.

WALKER,

Each One, Pull One (Thinking of Lorraine Hansberry), in

HORSES MAKE A LANDSCAPE LOOK MORE BEAUTIFUL 50, 50-53 (1984).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
Id. at 267.
Id. at 267-70.
Id.
Id. at 270.
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does not apply in this case. 195 He distinguishes between schoolsponsored student expression (such as articles appearing in Spectrum) and "personal" student expression "that happens to occur on
s
the school premises. 1 96
The latter situation is protected by Tinker;
197
the former is not.
Justice White argues that educators are entitled to exercise greater control over expression occurring within
the curriculum. He concludes that educators may constitutionally
exercise control "over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. ' 198 Because Spectrum is
a school-sponsored component of the curriculum and because the
principal could reasonably conclude the topics discussed were inappropriate for certain age groups or might violate the privacy interests of some students, the Court finds the school's conduct
constitutional. 199
In describing the degree of constitutional protection afforded a
school newspaper, the Court divides the school into two channels of
dialogue: unsponsored and sponsored. In the first channel, where
"personal" speech just "happens" to occur, the school's interest in
imparting knowledge or skills is presumptively weak. Student
speech transmitted through this conduit remains protected by the
traditional Tinker standard. The second channel is dominated pri195. Id.
196. Id. at 271.

197. Id.
198. Id. at 273. The difference between a "school-sponsored" and "curricular" activity (if one exists here) is not laid out specifically in the majority's opinion. According to Justice White, school-sponsored student speech would
include school newspapers, theatrical productions, or any other expressive activity that "students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Id. at 271. Such activities, would
constitute part of the school's curriculum even if outside the classroom, as long
as they were supervised by a teacher and "designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences." Id.
By holding that the "reasonable relationship" test applies to all schoolsponsored speech (as opposed to school-sponsored speech within the curriculum) the majority implies that either (1) a finding of school sponsorship necessarily includes a finding of a curricular interest, or (2) a finding of a curricular
interest is ultimately irrelevant to the standard as long as there is school sponsorship. Neither option makes perfect sense. The first possibility would expand the curriculum to include literally everything the school pays for, as well
as anything the public might perceive the school as supporting. This definition
of curriculum proves too broad to serve any purpose. The second possibility,
while more internally consistent, collides with the principles articulated in
Pico, which explicitly grants educators less editorial control over a schoolfunded program outside the curriculum (in this case, a school library) than one
inside the curriculum. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869; see also Romano v. Harrington, 725
F. Supp. 687, 690 (E.D.N.Y., 1989) (partially relying on Pico's distinction between curricular and extra-curricular, court refuses to apply the Hazelwood
standard to a school-sponsored, extra-curricular newspaper).
199. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274-76 (1988).
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marily by the school. Although student voices occasionally filter
back and forth, they do so only with permission of school officials
and only when their wavelengths do not vary substantially from the
school's dominant message.
The Hazelwood opinion is disturbing for three main reasons.
First, in reaching its decision the majority refused to apply the
Tinker standard. 20 0 Tinker would have required East Hazelwood's
principal to justify his actions in the familiar language of a "reasonable fear" of "material interference."'20 1 Tinker, after all, never distinguished between school-sponsored and personal student
expression. 20 2 Only two years before Hazelwood, in Fraser, the
Court had arguably invoked the Tinker standard (although not by
name) to uphold the punishment of a student for a speech made as
part of a school-sponsored assembly. 20 3 In addition, it is not unlikely that, with some small adjustments, the Court could have
reached its same result through the Tinker analysis. Thus it could
have concluded that the students' articles threatened to disrupt the
school's educational mission by using its own channels to dissemi20 4
nate information.
Most likely, the possibility of adjusting Tinker to justify the
school's conduct in Hazelwood did not satisfy the Court's Authorityminded faction. The Authority model holds that a school's educational interest requires it to dominate certain channels with its
message. 20 5 It supposes that such channels can be realistically defined and insulated so as to allow school officials to enjoy flexibility
in their approaches without fear of legal conflict. 20 6 For this reason, Justice White does not see Fraseras a case about disruption of
the school's mission, but instead about the school's attempt to define social norms within an "official school assembly. '20 7 Hazelwood presented an opportunity for those Justices carrying the
banner of Authority to draw the line between the voice of the
200. See Note, High School Newspapers and the Public Forum Doctrine:Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 74 VA. L. REV. 843, 859-61 (1988); Note,
supra note 24.
201. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969).
202. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. Cf. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 672, 683-85 (1986)
("sexually explicit monologue" given at school assembly is seriously damaging
to younger teenage students and undermines the school's "basic educational
message").
205. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text discussing the control aspect of the Authority model.
206. See supra notes 68-104 for an indepth discussion on the Authority
model.
207. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 n.4 (1988).
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school and the voice of the student once and for all. But ultimately
their attempt to draw this line becomes overly complicated. The
Court begins by importing the public-forum doctrine from adult
speech cases. Eventually it entangles itself in elusive distinctions
involving sponsorship and curriculum.
This resulting confusion is the second peculiarity in the Hazelwood opinion. The Court's various distinctions concerning public
forums, sponsored expression, and curricular activities are at once
disjointed and easy to manipulate. To begin with, the majority's
opinion offers two separate tests for justifying increased school control over student speech: one (the public forum doctrine) dividing
the school into two kinds of places, the other (the sponsorship rule)
dividing student speech into two kinds of voices. Justice White begins his legal analysis by asking whether or not the Spectrum constitutes a public forum. 20 8 He finds that Spectrum is not a public
forum because it is part of a journalism class. Next, he concludes
that, based on the newspaper's nonpublic status alone, school officials were entitled to regulate its content "in any reasonable manner." 20 9 Although the majority seems to have already reached a
basis on which to ground its decision, it moves on to a second subsection in order to discuss the issue of school sponsorship. 210 The
Court concludes that because Hazelwood sponsored the newspaper,
the school is entitled to regulate the style and content of the newspaper so long as such regulation is reasonably related to educational
2 11
concerns.
Even after careful reading of the majority's opinion, it is not
clear exactly what the difference between these two tests is or why
it matters. The question of whether the medium of expression is a
nonpublic forum turns on whether the school authorities have "by
policy or by practice" opened the forum for "indiscriminate use by
the general public" or by some segment of the population such as
student organizations. 212 Because Spectrum is an integral part of
the journalism curriculum, the Court concludes the school could
not have intended the paper for such broad use.213 If we are to take
the majority's opinion literally, this finding alone is enough to sidestep the Tinker rule and permit the school's broad editorial control.
Such a conclusion suggests that the Tinker standard only applies in
208. Id. at 267-70.
209. Id. at 270.
210. Id. at 270-73.
211. Id. at 273.
212. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Education Assn v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7, 47 (1983)).
213. Id. at 270 ("A decision to teach leadership skills in the context of a classroom activity hardly implies a decision to relinquish school control over that
activity").
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public forums intentionally created by the school. Tinker, however,
which extolled a student's right to express herself "in the cafeteria,
or on the playing field, or on the campus," clearly envisioned
214
broader student protection than this.
The question of school-sponsorship, on the other hand, appears
to turn on a combination of community perceptions and the school's
intent to convey knowledge. Justice White writes that school-sponsored speech includes expressive activities "that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school." 2 15 A school's greater control of such expressive activities is justified by the school's interest in assuring
that participants in the sponsored activity learn the intended
2 16
lessons.
The exact relationship between the public-forum doctrine and
the school-sponsorship doctrine remains unclear. While the Court's
language encourages us to view these inquires as independent, it is
doubtful that a finding of school sponsorship could have sustained
the Court's holding if Spectrum had first been declared an open forum. Likewise, the Court, despite its confident assurances, could
not have based its results solely on the public forum doctrine without directly confronting Tinker.
Most likely both tests are very similar ways of reaching the
same conclusion. Although their criteria differ slightly, we can see
each as ultimately turning on the fact that the students' articles
were specifically part of the school's educational process and were,
as a result, within the proper latitude of school censors. 217 But even
after collapsing these two standards into a single rule affirming
school control over school supervised activities, this rule still provides little guidance in determining the boundaries of schoolsponsorship.
Does such a rule mean school authorities could lawfully require prior review of an underground student newspaper distributed as part of a senior class celebration in which the faculty took
214. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 51213 (1969). In fact, the Court in Tinker makes no mention of the public-forum
doctrine at all.
215. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
216. Id. at 271.
217. In fact, the degree of latitude offered state officials under either test is
very similar. Under Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985), the government may impose any restrictions on speech in a nonpublic
forum that are "reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 800. Under
Hazelwood's standard, state school officials may regulate in any manner "reasonably related to pedagogical concerns". Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. At least
one federal circuit has found the Hazelwood standard to be a direct application
of the Cornelius standard. See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir.
1989).
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part? 218 Could school officials lawfully refuse objectionable advertisements in an athletic bulletin published outside of class and distributed after school? 219 Surely a school could claim these activities
were designed at least in part to convey lessons of personal responsibility, socialization, and the rewards of perseverance and hard
work. Yet were we to extend Hazelwood's school-sponsorship standard to these difficult cases, there might be little protected student
activity left.
The third disturbing point about the Hazelwood opinion is that
even if one could properly distinguish between sponsored and nonsponsored student speech, the Court does not adequately justify
handling sponsored speech differently. In dictum, the Court seems
not only to allow, but to endorse viewpoint restrictions on student
speech within sponsored channels. A school "must" retain the
right, according to the majority, to bar from its channel, "speech
that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use,
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the
'shared values of a civilized social order.' "220 Significantly, the
Court suggests no limit on how far viewpoint discrimination in the
curriculum might extend. It similarly ignores the precedents set by
Meyer, Barnette, and Pico, which explicitly bar attempts to impose
221
political orthodoxy in the curriculum.
Ultimately, these objections raise concerns about the distinction between sponsorship and non-sponsorship. This concern lies at
the heart of the Engagement perspective. By locking free student
speech out of curricular dialogue, courts limit students' ability to
formally connect with other groups of students and (more importantly) teachers and administrators. By allowing greater control of
school-sponsored student speech, Hazelwood severely inhibits the
deliberative role of its members.
218. See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply the
"reasonableness" standard in Hazelwood to an underground newspaper distributed at a senior class barbecue at which faculty were present); Recent Developments, Student Freedom ofExpression in Public High Schools, Burch v. Barker,
861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988), 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (1989). Although the
court in Barker claims to reach this conclusion easily under both Tinker and
Hazelwood, the answer may not be so clear. See infra note 242 for a discussion
on predistribution review of non-school sponsored communications.
219. See Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School Dist., 887 F.2d 935 (9th
Cir. 1989) (allowing school district to reject advertisements for Planned
Parenthood in schools' newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic programs because
all these publications play a role in the school's mission).
220. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (citation
omitted).
221. Fortunately, no courts have yet interpreted the holding of Hazelwood to
allow viewpoint discrimination, although some school boards have made the argument. See, e.g., Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7 (despite school board's argument,
Hazelwood does not eliminate the requirement that restrictions on speech in a
curricular activity be viewpoint neutral).
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The students' work on Spectrum provides an excellent example of just how discursive participation among students should
work. Obviously concerned with the many social forces influencing
young people today, East Hazelwood's student reporters, along with
their faculty adviser, devoted a section of Spectrum to explore the
issues of divorce, runaways, juvenile delinquency, and teenage marriage and pregnancy. 222 These articles promised a way for student
readers to better understand the challenges of their own lives and
encouraged future dialogue on these subjects. By interviewing
teenage mothers and children of divorced families, the student reporters reached out to the sometimes overlooked margins of the
student community and sought to join those perspectives with the
perspectives of other school members. Ideally, these reports invited
students to empathize with the experiences of others, to see themselves in a kind of extended family where societal pressures influence its members in very different ways.
Had East Hazelwood's principal not deleted the stories from
the school's newspapers, these reports and the interviews could
have then initiated a dialogue among students and faculty. They
could have explored the ways that a community might reduce teenage pregnancy rates or support teenage parents.
To be sure, listening to the voices of those involved in unexpected pregnancies or broken families is not always pleasant for
either students or adults. The principal, for instance, felt the students' frank talk about their sexual histories and "use or nonuse of
birth control" seemed inappropriate and likely to encourage sexual
irresponsibility. 223 He also worried that the articles might offend
the boyfriends and parents of the interviewed students. 224 However, neither the school nor the community will ever find ways of
counselling responsible sex unless they first legitimate the feelings
teenagers have and learn to understand them. Likewise, one will
never appreciate the disruptive force of family separation by turning a deaf ear to that student in the name of protecting her parents.
Any school truly devoted to improving the lives of its students
should remember Ernest Bloch's powerful observation that "the
standpoint of the victims of any society ought to always provide the
'225
starting point for the critique of that society.
The need of a school-sponsored forum in these kinds of discussions is especially important. Unlike conversations in the cafeteria,
222. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264 n.1.
223. Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the majority, along with East Hazelwood's principal apparently read the pregnancy article as advocating irresponsi-

ble sex).

224. Id. at 274.
225. As quoted in Giroux & McLaren, supra note 97, at 221.
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or even reports in an underground newspaper, the school-sponsored
forum gives the issues discussed legitimacy in the eyes of faculty
and the administration and demands their attention. After the
principal excised their stories, the reporters of East Hazelwood
later did distribute their stories on their own. 226 But the fact that
the school's "legitimate" channels had rejected these students essentially branded them as rebels and troublemakers with nothing
constructive to say. We can imagine that any teacher or student
sympathetic to their views would certainly have felt reluctant to
introduce such topics into relevant classroom discussions. Any
school devoted to free speech as a means of communion with others
and of creative social reform cannot allow broad censorship in the
forums where it really matters. "Freedom of expression would not
truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for
' 227
crackpots.
Hazelwood marks a dangerous course in student speech jurisprudence, not merely because it cuts back dramatically on the protection of student speech, but because it creates out of whole cloth,
a new distinction between sponsored and unsponsored speech. It
discourages student discourse exactly where it is needed most. The
decision has produced a chilling effect in some areas and has
sparked legislative reform in others. According to the Student
Press Law Center in Washington, D.C., reports of actual or
threatened school censorship have significantly increased after the
Hazelwood decision. 228 Many student authors now censor themselves before waiting to be told an article on a topic such as pregnancy or abortion is "inappropriate. ' 229 Some student readers now
dismiss their school's official newspapers as a bullhorn for the administration's view. 230 Concerned over this silencing effect, some
states, including California and Iowa, have passed laws to extend
Tinker-style protections to student speech in school-sponsored
231
forums.
226. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir.
1986).
227. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
228. Hechinger, About Education: How Free Should High School Newspapers Be? State Legislatures Weigh Protections,N. Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at B7,
col. 1.
229. Baker, Stilling the Voice of the Schools?, Washington Post (Nat'l
Weekly ed.), Feb. 13-19, 1989, at 34.
230. See, e.g., Paper Gets F from Some Medfield Teachers, Boston Globe,
April 7, 1989, at 17 (students run a controversial underground newspaper because the school newspaper is "basically what the administration wants to say.")
231. See Hechinger, supra,note 228. Iowa's recent law states that "students
of public schools have the right to exercise freedom of speech including the
right of expression in official publications," provided the articles are not "ob-
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Ironically, the Autonomy model's focus on individual liberties
may have distracted the Court from seeing the link between student-speech and community involvement. For as long as the majority could see student-speech rights as tied to personal dress or
private inquiry in a library, it could reserve curricular activities involving students and faculty for something else.
B. Hazelwood's Progeny
The battlelines between sponsorship and non-sponsorship now
drawn, students and school officials are struggling to further define
and broaden their territory in the courts. Student speech cases after Hazelwood focus primarily on whether the deferential Hazelwood standard applies. This inevitably leads courts to the question
of what defines "sponsorship" and the "curriculum."
The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the decision of a Florida district court to apply Hazelwood to school textbooks. 232 The
district court allowed a school to remove an anthology that contained Lysistrata and Chaucer's The Miller's Tale even though
neither piece has been assigned. 233 Seeming reluctant to reach its
result, the district court wrote that "[g]iven the breadth of the
Kuhlmeier decision ...this Court must apply the Kuhlmeier standard [requiring a reasonable relation to a pedagogical goal] to the
present case." 234 In a subsequent case, the Eleventh Circuit extended Hazelwood's broad rational to uphold speech restrictions on
a university campus.

235

In Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada, Inc. v. Clark
County School District,236 the Ninth Circuit invoked Hazelwood to
uphold a ban on advertisements for Planned Parenthood in a
number of school publications, including a non-curricularathletic
program. "Though the programs are not part of the school district's
curriculum," the court wrote, "they are disseminated under [the
school's] auspices [and] therefore play a role, however small, in the
237
school's mission."
The school had argued that its ban furthered school interests
by (among other things) avoiding controversy and by insuring that
the school did not violate a state law that required sex education to
scene, libelous or slanderous" and do not "incite students to commit unlawful
acts on school property or break school rules." Id.
232. Virgil II, 862 F.2d 1517.
233. Virgil v. School Bd. of Colombia County, Florida, 677 F. Supp 1547, 1548,
1552 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
234. Id. at 1552.
235. Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n of the U. of Alabama,
867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1989).
236. 887 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1989).
237. Id. at 943 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272).
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be taught by licensed teachers or school nurses.23 8 Despite any
showing that the school's fears were justified, the court easily found
the school's conduct reasonably related to a pedagogical objective. 239 The court wrote:
Hazelwood grants wide latitude in controlling the content of schoolsponsored publications. The newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic event
programs all "bear the imprimatur of the school." [Citation omitted.]
It is thus reasonable for the school district to attempt to ensure that
the "views of
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to
240
the school."
Only one year before this decision, students in a Washington
high school had successfully persuaded the Ninth Circuit to protect
speech featured in Bad Astra, a non-sponsored, underground newspaper. 241 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Hazelwood's approval of
prior review for school-sponsored material necessarily implied a
"corollary" that "no similar content control is justified for communication among students which is not part of the educational
242
program."
In Romano v. Harrington,243 a New York district court raised
student-speech protections one more notch. In Romano, a school
discharged a faculty advisor for allowing The Crows Nest, the
school's newspaper, to publish a student's article opposing a federal
holiday for Martin Luther King, Jr.244 Even though the newspaper
was school-sponsored and advised by a teacher, the court refused to
apply the Hazelwood standard because the paper was not formally
part of the curriculum. 245 The court acknowledged Hazelwood's invitation to interpret a school's curriculum broadly, but declined the
offer. "Because educators may limit student expression in the
name of pedagogy, courts must avoid enlarging the venues within
which that rationale may legitimately obtain without a clear and
'24 s
precise directive.
At least one court has suggested that not all student-speech
controversies will be played out on the distinction between school
238. Id. at 945-46.
239. There was reason to suspect the school's policy was not based on realistic fears, since other high schools in the Clark County area had allowed the
Planned Parenthood advertisements without problems. See id. at 938-39.
240. Id. at 946.
241. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1988).
242. Id. at 1157. But see Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
273 n.6 (1988) (leaving the question open as to what restrictions apply to policies
of prior review of non-sponsored student expression).
243. 725 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
244. Id. at 687.
245. Id. at 689.
246. Id.
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speech and personal speech. In Searcey v. Harris,247 members of
the Atlanta Peace Alliance challenged a school policy involving a
school's "Career Day." The school's policy welcomed military
recruiters, but expressly excluded members of the Peace Alliance. 248 The school justified its policy on the grounds that
presenters should be currently affiliated with their fields (insuring
they were knowledgeable), and that controversial or critical
presentations should be avoided. 249 The Eleventh Circuit found the
"Career Day" program to be both part of the curriculum and a nonpublic forum, and, therefore, used Hazelwood's deferential standard. 25 0 It then struck down the policies excluding the Peace Alli251
ance as not rationally related to the school's legitimate goals.
In discussing the school's requirement that recruiters be currently affiliated with their fields, the court refused to defer to the
school board's policy without a showing that the lack of present affiliation posed any problems. 252 "There is no evidence which even
arguably explains the Board's [choice of policy]," said the court,
"[w]e cannot infer the reasonableness of a regulation from a vacant
record. "253
The court similarly questioned the school's second rationale for
the Peace Alliance, which was to avoid critical or controversial
presentations. The court conceded that the objective of providing
non-controversial, motivational information to students was legitimate. But it found unreasonable the school's attempt to achieve
this goal by totally banning the organization (rather than by limiting what it can say). 25 4 The court further held that while a ban on
pejorative language could reasonably be justified by a desire to en255
courage students, the exclusion of negative facts could not.
Hazelwood's progeny emphasizes some important points regarding the current state of student speech law. The key question
posed by Hazelwood is still whether or not its standard applies to a
particular case. Finding the answer is confusing. Some courts place
more emphasis on a curricular relationship than on sponsorship. 256
247. 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
248. Id. at 1316.
249. Members of the Atlanta Peace Alliance included former, but not present, military personnel. They sought to present students with an "alternative,"
and often negative, view of career life in the military. Id. at 1317.
250. Id. at 1318.
251. Id. at 1322.
252. Id. at 1321-22.
253. Id. at 1322 (emphasis in original).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1323.
256. See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988); Romano, 725 F. Supp.
687.
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Others do the reverse. 257 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits at times
seem to waffle between narrow and broad interpretations of Hazelwood's scope.

258

Recently, cases such as Planned Parenthoodand Searcey have
suggested that the definition of "reasonableness" under Hazelwood
is yet another pressure point in student-speech doctrine. The
Planned Parenthood court's heavy concern with protecting the
school from views attributable to it demonstrates the power and
breadth of this argument once accepted by a court. On the other
hand, the Searcey court's willingness to put teeth into Hazelwood's
reasonableness standard shows that speech protections within a
school's official channels may not have completely eroded.
Planned Parenthood and Searcey are also significant because
they involve the efforts of outside community members to seek an
audience with students. These are cases where both the rights of
speakers and listeners are at stake. Although both the courts in
PlannedParenthoodand Searcey framed their issues as the right of
outside organizations to use the school's forum to address students,
the courts could also have seen the issue as one involving the students' right to receive ideas. 259 Viewed from the perspective of Engagement, these apparently separate interests are actually
manifestations of a single shared interest in social dialogue. Such
cases as Planned Parenthood and Searcey underscore the mutual
interest schools and communities both have in leading students to
260
examine such basic moral issues as love and war.
Building bridges of productive dialogue between students and
the community cannot be accomplished with the current judicial
tools. Sharpening the lines between protected and unprotected
speech, in the spirit of Barker or Romano, does not fortify students
with the real power to change their communities. Similarly, students cannot always rely on courts to scrutinize school justifications
as the Eleventh Circuit did in Searcey. The solution lies in switching the focus from the "Authority versus Autonomy" battle to the
fulfillment of civic republican politics within the school. The Engagement theory argues for a first amendment jurisprudence that
aims to protect group civic education of students, as well as their
political role in the community. Both of these values depend on
granting students the means to define themselves in community
257. See Planned Parenthood,887 F.2d 935; Virgil v. School Bd. of Colombia
County, Florida, 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
258. See Planned Parenthood, 887 F.2d 935; Barker, 861 F.2d 1149; Virgil II,
862 F.2d 1517; Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
259. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 866-67.
260. It is ironic that the court in Planned Parenthood,while deferring to local sensitivities, ultimately isolated students from certain perspectives in the
larger community.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 24:339

contexts and to contribute to the improvement of their society in a
meaningful way.
C. A New Doctrine
Having studied communitarian examples of educational and
political thought, and having examined the practical pitfalls of Hazelwood, we begin to see what a new doctrine of speech based on
Engagement would look like. Such a doctrine would seek primarily
to foster the kind of self-defining, deliberative dialogue discussed in
Part II. It would teach citizenship and responsibility by example.
To understand the meaning of free-expression or democratic consensus, students would be free to explore issues such as pregnancy,
drug abuse, or AIDS. The new doctrine would seek to pull students
into the political process and to make the school and larger community responsive to them.
Aspiring for deliberative dialogue would mean erasing certain
distinctions set down in Hazelwood. First, the distinction between
sponsored student expression and non-sponsored expression would
be eliminated. This distinction is not at all obvious in hard cases
and encourages litigation on both sides to set limits. More importantly, holding sponsored speech to a higher standard blocks avenues of dialogue between groups of students and adults within the
school community.
A new student speech doctrine would also wipe out any distinction between public or non-public forums. This dichotomy, borrowed from adult speech cases, has little relevance in pubic
secondary schools.26 1 High schools are not parks or town squares.
Neither are they closed-circuit transmission lines. Rather, schools
are, ideally, centers for connection and learning - forums of Engagement. The unique status of schools explains why neither Ha.
zelwood, nor the cases following it, can clearly articulate the
independent significance of the public/non-public distinction in
their reasoning.
From a practical standpoint, a new student-speech doctrine
would also be as clear and easy to follow as possible. Ease of application will aid judges in future disputes. Clarity will help avoid
costly and inefficient litigation in the first place. A new doctrine
should, therefore, avoid such protean concepts, as "curriculum" or
"sponsorship," whenever possible. It should explicitly ground its
standards in a consistent philosophy of educational and constitutional interpretation so that neither courts nor school officials will
261. Indeed, the Court in Tinker found no such distinction relevant either.
Recent decisions applying Tinker (where Hazelwood did not apply) have refused to inquire into the forum's status as public or non-public. See, e.g., Rivera
v. East Otero School Dist. R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (D. Colo. 1989).
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get lost in applying its rules. Yet although a doctrine based on Engagement should seek to avoid litigation, it should not fear confrontation in non-judicial forums. Disagreements between students and
administrators about their respective freedoms is inevitable and is a
necessary process in reaching political awareness. A new doctrine
would, therefore, encourage a healthy means of confrontation and
dispute resolution.
A doctrine of Engagement would also be expansive and flexible. It would anticipate controversies involving school dialogue of
all kinds, from student publications to textbook selections. It would
also seek to protect two-way lines of communication among school
members and community members as well.
Keeping these guidelines in mind, we might envision the following free speech doctrine for high schools. First, to protect the
school's interest in relaying academic lessons, school officials could
regulate or ban student speech that directly threatens to substantially disrupt the educational mission of the school. Aside from
speech that incites fights, blockades, or other obvious physical disruption, schools could also control student speech that directly interferes with or interrupts a school while it is delivering its
message. This standard would specifically protect student speech
which happens to conflict with the school's message, but does not
directly interrupt the school's speech or distract its audience from
subject areas currently being discussed. Courts would emphasize
that since verbal style and imagery are deeply connected with a
speaker's experiences and perspective, one's manner of speaking
could not, in and of itself, constitute grounds for regulation. This
standard, borrowed from Tinker, would apply to all communications where students participate either as speakers or listeners.
Second, to protect the school's legitimate interest in conveying
civic values, school officials would be permitted to restrict student
speech that intentionally threatens to substantially disrupt deliberative dialogue itself. This rule allows schools to target "hate
speech" - speech that deliberately stigmatizes or victimizes an individual or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or
sexual preference. Because hate speech excludes or devalues the
contributions of certain groups in school discourse, schools of Engagement have little interest in protecting it. But because such
schools have a large interest in encouraging open discussion of diverse views, courts would limit restrictions on hate speech to expressions that deliberately and directly interfere with tolerant
discussion. Hate speech restrictions would not be used to fuel the
causes of those who would censor works of literary merit, such as
Huckleberry Finn or The Merchant of Venice. Though these works
occasionally offend, they do not explicitly argue for the inferiority

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 24:339

or isolation of any group. Similarly, schools would not be allowed to
censor student expression merely because it articulates a political
26 2
stance unpopular with minority groups or women.
Today efforts to restrict hate speech are best known on university campuses, where they have sparked considerable controversy. 26 3 At the university level, these restrictions raise difficult
questions about the relationship between the right to free speech
and the right to protection against discrimination. 264 Yet bans on
hate speech at the high school level should not generate such controversy, where schools are already charged with the responsibility
of socializing students for participatory democracy.
In addition to substantive guidelines on speech that disrupts
academics and student discourse, a free-speech standard based on
Engagement would also require procedural protections. These protections would strongly favor resolutions achieved through dialogue
between school authorities and students. Before a school could censor student speech for either of the substantive reasons listed above,
it would have to provide a prompt, informal hearing in which school
officials make their case for censorship and allow the student
speakers (or listeners) to respond. 265 Only if the challenged expression clearly threatens immediate, physical disruption, could a
school censor the speech without such a process. In those cases, the
school would still be required to conduct a similar hearing with the
student after the censorship had occurred. Ultimately this pfrocedural safeguard would serve two purposes. It would (1) help assure
that in all cases of censorship, the school had exhausted at least
some of the less restrictive means available to it, and (2) engage the
school and the student in a dialogue, in which ideally, the two
would not only discuss the merits of the controversial message, but
work together to develop a way to realize the interests of both par262. Thus, the student speech in Romano, which opposed a federal holiday

honoring Martin Luther King, Jr., would remain protected, as would principled
arguments against such issues as affirmative action or comparable worth laws.
263. See Wilson, Colleges'Anti-HarassmentPolicies Bring Controversy over
Free-Speech Issues, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Note,
FirstAmendment - Racist and Sexist Expression on Campus - Court Strikes
Down University Limits on Hate Speech. - Doe v. University of Michigan, 721
F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), 103 HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1397 (1990). At least 15
colleges and universities have adopted or are considering restrictions on slurs
directed at members of historically disadvantaged groups. Note, supra, at 1397
n.1.
264. See Note, supra note 263, at 1399-1400 (arguing against the protection of
hate speech); see also Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (1985) (justifying the protection of hate
speech). A federal district court recently struck down a rule against hate
speech at the University of Michigan on free speech grounds. See Does v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
265. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring a school hearing before
or immediately after a student's temporary suspension from high school).
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ties in a way that did not substantially harm the other. Even if the
school did ultimately ban the interest, the student would have won
an audience of influential members of the school community.
To understand how these rules would work in practice, we can
imagine how this standard would apply in Hazelwood itself. On the
facts of Hazelwood, the principal, having learned of the students'
articles on divorce and teen pregnancy, would first decide whether
266
he has the power to remove the articles under the new doctrine.
He will conclude that he does not. Although he may be able to argue at a hearing that the publication of such articles would conflict
with the school's interest in responsible sex or personal privacy, the
principal could not convincingly show that publication of the stories
would lead to immediate disruption. Further, publication of the articles would not interrupt the school in the course of voicing its own
message.
This does not, however, mean the principal does not have options. In this case, he should meet with the student reporters in
order to express his anxiety. He would preface his remarks by
making clear that regardless of the outcome of the discussion, the
students would retain the right to publish their stories if they still
wanted to. This tactic shifts the terms of discussion from whether
or not they may publish their articles to whether or not they
should. The principal thus emphasizes the responsibility that
comes with democratic participation.
Next, the principal should discuss the students' reasons for
wanting to print the stories and attempt compromises that protect
the interests of both parties. Should compromise prove impossible,
the students would print their stories. But the principal could insist
that an editorial representing the school's viewpoint run on the
same page as the other stories. Ideally, the principal could even invite a student who shared his ideas to write an editorial representing the school's view. In this way the school avoids silencing
important student dialogue and asks student readers to critically
evaluate the stories in the newspaper. To the extent that the principal can publish his own messages along side those of the students,
he will maintain greater influence over communications in the
school than if he had forced the reporters to publish their articles in
an underground newspaper.
266. Under my proposed system, it is not certain that the principal would
learn of the students' stories before publication. Since the Engagement doctrine does not distinguish between sponsored or unsponsored speech, the principal could not insist on prior review unless he also insisted on such review for
unsponsored speech. Such a blanket demand would likely chill speech and
would cut against the principles of Engagement. For the sake of this example,
we may assume that the principle has, nonetheless, learned of these stories
from students or faculty members.
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The same reasoning behind the standards for student expression also extend to the selection of books and materials within the
curriculum. Students have a right to course selections not influenced by political bias so that class discussions can properly develop
understandings of diverse community viewpoints. Although
schools would be free to select or remove books for reasons other
than those supported by political bias, there should be a strong presumption against course lists which systematically exclude the experiences of significant groups of people whose ideas directly relate
to the course from which they are excluded.
To protect students' interest in receiving and discussing ideas
within the curricula, schools would be required to implement a
standard review process for schools wishing to remove books from
the curricula. Similarly, if a large number of students or parents
believed schools were refusing to include relevant books on the basis of political or cultural bias, the school would be required to hold
a hearing in which all points of view could be discussed. Short of
litigation, school officials would still probably retain ultimate control over their selections. Yet the presence of a hearing would provide a forum for deliberative discussion to take place. By requiring
school officials to justify their actions in rational terms, this process
267
would prevent much arbitrary censorship of school books.
A student-speech doctrine emphasizing broad speech protections in school forums and procedural guarantees would not only
benefit more privileged schools in relatively peaceful neighborhoods, it would also benefit urban schools confronted with racial
tension and violence. Deliberative dialogue alone will never eradicate such complicated problems. But broad speech protections can
engage students in an active search for a more peaceful community.
The "just community" program at Roosevelt High attests to the
peace-keeping power students can realize when encouraged to analyze together and set examples for one another. 268 The success of
student mediation programs throughout the country similarly point
to the positive effect that frank discussions can have even between
269
students unaccustomed to using words to resolve disputes.
The procedural guarantees are especially important in diverse
urban areas, where school officials may be more likely to dismiss
minority positions as too controversial or misguided. Freer speech
267. See Formal Censorship ProceduresActually Help Schools Keep Books,
GroupsAgree, Education Daily, at 6 (Sept. 9, 1988) (while rates of challenges are
higher in districts with formal review policies, rates of ultimate removal are
lower than in districts without such procedural protections).
268. See supra notes 156-58 and corresponding text for a discussion on the
"just community" program at Roosevelt High.
269. See supra notes 159-65 and corresponding text for a discussion on successful school mediation programs.
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in school forums, as well as required pre-censorship hearings would
also allow opportunities for students and administrators to communicate views on serious topics that otherwise might be neglected or
left only to school disciplinary hearings. Protecting student voice in
this way empowers schools in times of peace and tumult, and eventually paves the way for more extensive changes in teaching and
curriculum that the principles of Engagement would promote.
CONCLUSION

In this essay I have argued that in the context of studentspeech cases, the Supreme Court has been viewing the interests of
the schools and the students in the wrong way. Cases such as Hazelwood and Tinker are ultimately not about weighing one's individual
interest in autonomous expression against the school's interest in
preserving the community. These controversies are about the efforts of students to define a relationship between their peers and
other members of the school in order to build consensus and to
transform their society. These are cases of connection, not
rebellion.
The theory of Engagement, based on an educational theory of
group learning and civic republicanism, seeks to join pro-liberties
concerns with more traditional interests in communal cohesiveness
and integrity. Success in this effort means razing the current wall
between sponsored and non-sponsored speech established in Hazelwood. Courts should also require schools to establish both procedural and substantive avenues for student voice to enter the heart
of classroom learning. Ultimately, opening the channels of community discussion within the school can lead to many things: a
stronger commitment to civic virtue, a deeper understanding of social structure, and meaningful contributions from students of diverse experiences. But it begins with one word. Listen.

